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Abstract	
The	debate	over	the	concept	of	security	is	often	discussed	in	terms	of	the	dominant	and	hegemonic	
states	in	the	field	of	security	studies,	international	relations	and	conflict	research.	Yet,	majority	of	the	
states	in	the	world	are	medium	or	small	in	their	physical	sizes	and	capabilities.	The	focus	of	this	re-
search,	however,	is	in	the	security	understanding	of	the	very	small	states	located	in	the	Caribbean,	in	
the	backyard	of	the	global	superpower	U.S.A.	The	former	colonies	of	the	European	powers	became	
independent	in	the	middle	of	the	Cold	War	and	have	then	looked	for	ways	to	preserve	their	inde-
pendency	in	the	changing	global	arena.	The	larger	debate	over	realist	and	liberal	thought	over	why	
states	cooperate	and	how	the	states	can	maximise	the	security	for	their	citizens	is	the	bigger	context	
in	which	this	study	belongs	to.		
	
By	doing	a	case	study	on	the	Caribbean	Community	and	why	it	has	developed	its	common	security	
strategy	and	shared	threat	perceptions	as	late	as	2013,	this	thesis	acknowledges	the	four-phases	of	
the	Caribbean	security	understanding	 identified	by	Jessica	Byron.	 It	expands	these	distinct	phases	
and	further	argues	that	there	is	a	new,	fifth	phase	of	security	understanding	in	the	Caribbean	that	
can	be	distinguished.	By	utilising	existing	research	and	analysing	documents	released	by	individual	
states,	intergovernmental	organisations	and	other	sources,	this	thesis	is	looking	to	discover	answer	
to	the	central	research	question:	what	led	to	the	deepening	of	security	cooperation	within	the	Car-
ibbean	Community.	The	hypothesis	then	is	that	the	small	size	and	limited	capabilities	have	contrib-
uted	to	the	appearance	of	new	security	concerns	which	have	overtaken	the	traditional	understanding	
of	security.		
	 ii	
	
After	having	identified	distinct	features	in	different	stages	of	security	understanding	in	the	Caribbean,	
the	thesis	identifies	a	fifth	phase	in	Caribbean	security	understanding	and	the	results	point	out	that	
the	process	of	integration	and	increasing	cooperation	in	CARICOM	is	driven	both	by	the	internal	need	
due	to	lack	of	domestic	capabilities	but	also	by	the	active	promotion	of	external	powers	who	have	
their	own	vested	interests	in	doing	so.		
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1. Chapter	1:	 Introduction	
In	the	field	of	international	relations	questions	concerning	national	security	are	often	discussed	in	
terms	of	the	big	and	the	powerful	thus	leaving	the	small	and	weak	to	attend	the	international	arena	
in	the	terms	of	the	big	and	hegemonic	states.	How	the	small	independent	Caribbean	states	under-
stand	security	and	how	that	concept	has	developed	to	date	is	somewhat	different	from	the	under-
standing	of	the	United	States	or	from	the	former	colonial	power	United	Kingdom’s	and	has	been	far	
less	studied,	especially	so	in	the	western	fields	of	international	relations,	security	or	peace	studies.	
While	the	asymmetry	between	the	economic	and	military	power	between	the	hegemonic	power,	
the	U.S.A.	and	the	small	Caribbean	states	has	been	vital	for	the	development	of	the	Caribbean	un-
derstanding	of	security,	it	is	also	important	to	recognise	the	Caribbean	as	the	westernmost	point	of	
the	European	Union	making	it	the	focal	point	in	the	competition	of	influence	between	the	EU	and	
the	U.S.A.	In	addition	to	that,	the	other	extra-regional	powers	have	had,	and	still	do	have	interests	
in	the	region	as	well.		The	end	of	the	Cold	War,	the	declining	U.S.A	hegemony	and	evolving	under-
standing	over	the	meaning	of	security,	have	influenced	the	Caribbean	states	along	with	the	rest	of	
the	world.	Even	though	the	critical	security	concepts	such	as	human,	environmental,	economical,	
and	cybersecurity	along	with	many	other	forms	of	security	are	important,	the	state	is	still	a	dominant	
actor	in	the	international	arena	and	thus	the	provider	and	guarantee	of	security.		
	
The	current	state	of	international	relations	can	be	argued	to	be	a	one	of	increasing	insecurity	ever	
since	the	9/11	terrorist	attacks.	Recently	there	has	been	a	new	rise	of	neorealism,	or	even	hostile	
nationalism,	as	the	wars	in	Afghanistan	and	Iraq,	Central	African	Republic,	Libya	and	Syria	are	creat-
ing	tremors	all	over	the	world;	the	refugees	seen	as	undermining	the	values	of,	what	were	thought	
to	be,	stable	European	states,	not	to	mention	the	British	decision	to	leave	the	European	Union	and	
the	election	of	Donald	Trump	as	the	45th	President	of	the	United	States.	This	leads	to	the	observation	
that	very	little	attention	is	given	to	the	liberal	project	that	has	been	taking	place	in	the	Caribbean,	
where	the	small	Caribbean	states	are	faced	with	a	multiplicity	of	threats	and	have	opted	to	follow	
the	example	of	European	Union	and	deepen	their	integration	to	new	level	by	introducing	security	as	
the	fourth	pillar	of	the	Caribbean	Community.	
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The	geographical	location	of	the	Caribbean,	makes	it	an	interesting	region	to	study	as	it	faces	South	
America	to	the	south,	Latin	America	to	the	west	and	the	U.S.A.	coastline	in	the	North,	while	to	the	
east	it	faces	Atlantic	Ocean	which	separates	the	Caribbean	from	the	former	colonial	powers	in	Eu-
rope.	In	addition	to	this,	the	small	size	of	the	Caribbean	states	and	their	sovereign	rights	in	the	in-
ternational	arena	make	it	interesting	from	the	Finnish	perspective	as	well.	Finland,	and	Finnish	peo-
ple,	together	with	the	other	Nordic	countries,	often	consider	themselves	as	small	countries	and	have	
also	developed	a	peaceful	and	stable	region.	Peaceful	coexistence	remains	as	one	of	the	greatest	
challenges	in	the	international	relations	from	the	peace	studies	perspective	and	this	highlights	the	
importance	of	studying	regions	that	have	had	success	in	this.		
	
Comprehending	what	is	meant	by	the	Caribbean	is	also	important	as	it	defines	which	countries	are	
included	in	the	study.	Serbín	(1998)	has	noted	three	definitions	of	Caribbean	used	in	academia	and	
foreign	policy	debates;	while	some	include	the	continental	countries	such	as	Mexico	and	Venezuela	
and	Colombia	to	be	part	of	it;	others	define	it	to	contain	only	the	islands	between	Atlantic	Ocean	
and	Caribbean	Sea.	Further,	defining	the	Caribbean	is	further	complicated	by	the	territories	of	the	
U.S.A,	France,	Netherlands	and	U.K.	that	are	in	the	region	and	would	bean	that	they	are	Caribbean	
states	as	well.	However,	in	this	study	I	am	focusing	on	the	Caribbean	Community	(CARICOM),	con-
sisting	of	15	member	states	and	5	associate	territories,	with	the	combined	population	of	16	million.	
The	 larger	context	of	 the	Greater	Caribbean	region	with	 the	combined	population	of	250	million	
people	is	important	and	is	also	considered	in	the	discussion.	The	CARICOM	was	established	in	1973	
with	the	treaty	of	Chaguaramas	for	three	purposes:	to	further	economic	integration	in	form	of	re-
gional	common	market;	to	promote	functional	cooperation	 in	sectors	such	as	culture,	education,	
labour	and	tourism,	of	which	the	University	of	West	Indies	is	an	example;	and	to	coordinate	foreign	
and	defence	policies.	(CARICOM,	1973;	Viera-Tirado,	2004.)			
	
The	Caribbean	island	states	gained	their	independency	after	the	Second	World	War	and	have	then	
not	had	the	first-hand	and	collective	experience	of	war	that	has	been	the	dominant	driver	for	inte-
gration	in	Europe	for	example	and	this	has	influenced	their	understanding	of	security.	During	the	
colonial	era	and	 in	 the	early	years	of	 independency,	 the	 security	of	Caribbean	 island	states	was	
guaranteed	by	the	former	colonial	powers	as	well	as	the	superpowers’	in	the	interest	of	preserving	
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the	status	quo	between	the	U.S.A	and	the	U.S.S.R.	during	their	Cold	War	rivalry.	The	security	under-
standing	of	the	Caribbean	national	security	has	developed	in	a	hemisphere	where	international	con-
flict	has	been	minimal	when	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	world,	the	U.S.A	and	Cuba	bigotry	and	the	
rivalry	between	Dominican	Republic	and	Haiti	being	exceptions,	and	it	has	been	declared	as	a	“zone	
of	peace”	by	the	OAS	already	in	1979	(Baranyi	&	Dosman,	1990)	and	in	January	29th	2014,	CELAC	
renewed	their		“commitment	to	consolidate	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	as	a	Zone	of	Peace,	in	
which	differences	between	nations	are	peacefully	settled	through	dialogue	and	negotiations	or	other	
means,	fully	consistent	with	International	Law”	(CELAC,	2014)	The	small	size	of	the	Caribbean	island	
states	and	the	lack	of	interstate	war	in	the	region	has	affected	their	security	conception	and	the	
neighbouring	countries	have	often	been	taken	as	a	lesser	threat,	for	example	than	a	foreign	super-
power	intervention.	 
	
	
Map		1,	Caribbean	Community,	(Caribbean	Atlas,	2017)	
	
The	treaty	of	Chaguaramas	was	revised	in	2001	but	it	was	not	until	2006	when	the	CARICOM	adopted	
security	as	its	fourth	pillar.	This	led	to	the	development	of	the	Common	Crime	and	Security	Strategy	
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in	2013	and	even	further	to	the	Caribbean	Strategic	Plan	in	2014	(IMPACS,	2013;	CARICOM,	2014).	
The	recent	 institutionalization	of	security	governance	in	the	region	however	challenges	the	tradi-
tional	understanding	of	sovereignty,	a	concept	which	has	been	highly	respected	in	the	region	due	to	
the	existential	debate	over	their	rights	to	exist	ever	since	their	independence.		
	
1.1 Previous	literature	on	state	cooperation	
1.1.1 Realism	and	Liberalism	
In	the	interwar	period,	a	great	debate	developed	among	the	European	scholars	representing	the	
realist	and	idealist	theories,	which	led	to	the	discovery	of	the	liberal	theory.	The	idealists	believed	
that	nation	states	could	coexist	peacefully	and	cooperate,	for	example	in	the	form	of	the	League	of	
Nations,	and	thus	ultimately	overcome	the	need	for	war.	The	Second	World	War,	however,	proved	
them	wrong	and	the	new	realist	thinkers,	such	as	Morgenthau,	Niebuhr	and	Carr,	among	others,	
developed	a	theory	which	sees	cooperation	to	be	based	on	interest,	rather	than	ideology.	Morgen-
thau,	for	example	argues	that	politics	and	international	society	are	based	on	the	human	nature	and	
rational	thinking	and	assumes	that	the	foreign	policy	actions	of	a	state	are	based	on	the	interest	of	
gaining	power.	The	concept	of	power	contains	“anything	that	establishes	and	maintains	the	control	
of	man	over	man”.	(1966,	p.	9)		Realists	see	states	as	units	operating	in	anarchical	environment	and	
thus	the	first	and	foremost	priority	is	the	survival	of	the	state.	To	do	this	state	must	pursue	power,	
traditionally	measured	in	terms	of	military	means	but	also	includes	factors	such	as	geography,	nat-
ural	 resources,	 industrial	 capacity	 and	population.	 (Morgenthau,	 1966,	 pp.	 106-144)	Dunne	 and	
Schmit	(2011)	have	recognised	three	core	elements	of	realism:	Statism,	Survival,	and	Self-help.	Stat-
ism	refers	to	the	eternal	role	of	the	state	as	the	legitimate	actor	in	the	international	arena,	where	
survival	 is	the	priority.	The	self-help	principle	arises	from	the	need	to	be	able	to	survive,	and	as-
sumption	that	states	can	ultimately	rely	only	on	themselves	to	provide	security.	Realists	see	regional	
organisations	and	alliances	as	a	way	in	which	states	try	to	survive	the	anarchical	international	arena	
(Viera-Tirado,	2004).	Grieco	has	more	critical	view	and	he	argues	that	for	realists	“international	an-
archy	fosters	competition	and	conflict	among	states	and	inhibits	their	willingness	to	cooperate	even	
when	they	share	common	interests”	(1988,	p.	485).	The	evolving	world	order	however	has	forced	
even	 the	 realists	 to	 re-examine	some	of	 their	principles	 to	 respond	 to	 the	needs	and	 threats	of	
modern	world.		
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From	the	neo-realist	perspective,	the	independence	and	survival	in	the	international	arena	are	the	
main	interest	of	states	and	therefore	any	success	of	regional	trade	agreement	is	dependent	on	these	
security	considerations.	International	regionalism	is	then	caused	by	attempts	to	improve	the	bar-
gaining	position	of	states	against	the	hegemonic	position	of	another	state.	For	example,	in	response	
to	increasing	bargaining	power	of	European	states	due	to	European	integration,	the	U.S.	created	
NAFTA,	and	correspondingly	East	Asian	nations	have	created	their	own	blocks.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004.)			
	
In	response,	the	neoliberal	approach	highlights	the	opportunities	that	increasing	interaction	brings	
upon.	“The	establishment	of	regional	institution	is	just	a	way	to	maximize	the	benefits	coming	from	
market	exchanges”	(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	p.	28).		Neorealist	scholar	Steven	Lamy	separates	relative	
and	 absolute	 gains	 following	 the	 argument	made	 by	 Grieco	 already	 in	 1988.	 Lamy	 argues	 that	
“states	are	interested	in	increasing	their	power	and	influence	(absolute	gains)	…states	are	also	con-
cerned	with	how	much	power	and	influence	other	states	might	achieve	(relative	gains)	in	any	coop-
erative	endeavour”	(2011,	p.	119).	Originally	Grieco	argued	that	states	are	as	worried	on	how	much	
their	partners	are	gaining	from	the	cooperation	as	they	are	on	possibility	of	cheating,	and	that	if	the	
partner	state	achieves	greater	gains	and	satisfactorily	complies	the	joint	agreement,	the	other	state	
might	exist	the	partnership”	because	the	partner	is	achieving	relatively	greater	gains”	(Grieco,	1988,	
p.	487).	
	
Idealism,	developed	in	inter-war	era	Europe,	in	return	shares	realisms’	view	that	the	world	is	in	an	
anarchical	 state,	but	disagree	with	 realists	on	 its	permanency.	 Instead,	 liberalism	has	a	belief	 in	
progress,	the	rule	of	law	and	in	the	idea	of	a	just	order,	democracy	and	peace.	Where	realism	be-
lieves	that	each	state	is	a	potential	enemy	to	another,	liberals	see	this	as	self-fulfilling	prophecy	and	
argue	that	this	can	be	avoided	by	the	Kantian	‘Cosmopolitan	law’	where	international	organisation	
is	set	out	to	control	states	behaviour.	They	also	believe	that	the	threat	of	undemocratic	regimes,	
imperialism	and	war	can	be	overcome	by	increasing	collective	security,	commerce	and	world	gov-
ernance.	(Dunne,	2011;	Russet,	2013.)	The	liberal	theory	has	produced	a	liberal	peace	theory,	which	
is	grounded	on	the	international	respect	for	individual	rights,	shared	commercial	interests	added	
with	constitutional	restraint	(Doyle,	2005).	Moravcsik’s	argument,	that	instead	of	freely	pursuing	
their	interests	in	the	international	arena,	states	are	constrained	by	the	interests	of	other	states	sup-
ports	this	(Moravcisk,	1997.)	The	carrying	idea	of	liberal	thought	then	is	the	aim	of	achieving	a	world,	
which	 is	not	 in	an	anarchical	condition	but	 in	peace	and	order.	The	very	distinctive	character	of	
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liberal	internationalism	is	arguably	that	relies	on	the	ethics	and	moral	of	humans,	compared	to	ne-
oliberalism,	which	in	turn	relies	mostly	on	a	cold	mathematical	rationality.	
	
1.1.2 Regionalization	and	Integration	
During	the	previous	century,	despite	the	realist	doubt	on	state	on	state	cooperation,	regionalization	
has	become	an	inherent	feature	of	international	relations.	Regionalization	processes	have	produced	
interdependencies	and	often	include	the	deepening	perceptions	of	common	interests	and	identity.	
As	a	part	of	the	process,	a	wide	range	of	agreements	with	a	mixture	of	contents	has	been	made	
between	states	and	a	distinction	can	be	made	between	cooperation	and	integration	processes	(Best	
&	Christiansen,	2011,	p.	430)	Increasing	regional	projects	leads	to	the	challenge	of	definitions.	While	
Hurrell	identifies	that	the	term	“regionalization”	can	be	used	to	refer	“to	the	growth	of	societal	in-
tegration	within	a	region	and…	the	often	undirected	processes	of	social	and	economic	interaction”	
(Hurrell,	1995,	p.	39),	Jules	argues	that	one	needs	to	distinguish	between	de	jure	state-driven	‘”re-
gionalism”	and	de	facto	market-driven	“regionalization’”	(Jules,	2015,	p.	38).	Regionalism,	according	
to	another	definition	 is	 “the	 conscious	bringing	 together	of	different	 states	 and	 societies	under-
pinned	by	perceived	need	to	pool	resources	and	face	external	challenges	collectively”	(Bishop	et	al	
2016,	p.	3).	Regionalism	as	defined	by	Schultz	et	al,	is	“the	body	of	ideas,	values	and	concrete	objec-
tives	that	are	aimed	at	creating	maintaining	or	modifying	the	provision	of	security	and	wealth,	peace	
and	development	within	a	region:	the	urge	by	any	set	of	actors	to	reorganise	along	particular	re-
gional	space”	(Quoted	in	Viera-Tirado,	2004,	p.	16)	The	debate	over	these	definitions	is	related	to	
the	question	over	why	states	do	cooperate	and	weather	integration	is	due	to	conscious	project	and	
is	led	by	someone,	or	whether	it	is	an	unconscious	product	of	social	interaction.	This	leads	to	the	
next	theoretical	debate.		
	
The	theories	over	why	states	cooperate	are	multiple	but	the	dominant	debate	is	over	realism,	liber-
alism,	internationalization	and	whether	cooperation	between	states	can	or	cannot	be	sustainable.		
In	a	deeper	level,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	the	nature	of	integration,	Tiilikainen	and	Palosaari	(2007,	
p.	11)	identify	two	approaches:	firstly,	the	cooperation	between	sovereign	states;	and	secondly	a	
process	of	forming	a	new	state	like	actor.	The	process	in	Europe	leading	to	the	evolvement	of	Euro-
pean	Union	as	semi-independent	foreign	policy	actor	is	an	example	for	the	later,	whereas	the	African	
Union	is	an	example	of	the	cooperation	between	sovereign	states.	Taking	this	into	an	account	when	
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studying	CARICOM	is	 important	 in	the	 light	of	the	 latest	strategic	plan,	which	notes	the	need	for	
common	identity,	that	is	a	big	step	towards	creating	a	new	state	like	actor.	However,	the	long-waited	
sovereignty	is	a	matter	of	prestige	for	the	Caribbean	nations	and	is	therefore	conflicting	with	the	
idea	of	new	state.		The	integration	in	the	Caribbean	and	Europe	are	not	completely	new	ideas	and	
theoretical	discussion	has	developed	to	explain	it.		
	
Thanks	to	the	 integration	process	which	has	been	taking	place	especially	within	Europe	after	the	
Second	World	War	leading	to	the	institution	of	European	Union	as	we	know	it	nowadays,	there	is	a	
wide	field	of	literature	on	integration	studies	and	especially	focusing	on	the	foreign	policy	issues	as	
EU	has	developed	common	foreign	and	security	policies.	While	studying	the	European	integration	
process,	Tiilikainen	has	recognized	trans-actionalism,	new	functionalism	and	intergovernmentalism	
based	on	realism	as	the	core	theoretical	foundations	for	increasing	integration.	(Tiilikainen,	2007).	
Knight	and	Persaud	identify	transactionalism	to	be	emerging	from	Karl	Deutch’s	works;	according	to	
them,	 “the	phenomenon	of	 political	 unification	 at	 the	 international	 level	 is	 comparable	 to	what	
would	be	observed	at	the	national	level	during	the	birth	of	nation	states”	(Knight	&	Persaud,	2001,	
p.	48).	They		also	note	that	the	school	sees	multiple	steps	in	the	process,	developing	functional	links	
such	as	trade	and	migration	between	communities,	the	functional	links	then	cause	transactions	lead-
ing	to	‘trans	community	networks’	which	eventually	leads	to	“assimilation	of	peoples	and	their	inte-
gration	into	larger	whole”	(Knight	&	Persaud,	2001,	pp.	48-49).	
	
In	turn,	neofunctionalism	is	based	on	Ernst	Haas	work	“the	Uniting	of	Europe”	(Haas,	1958)	,	and	this	
school	argues	that	forming	of	institutions	leads	to	a	community	and	that	continuing	integration	is	
more	rewarding	than	defecting	from	the	unification	process.	Knight	and	Persaud	argue	that	“inher-
ent	in	integration	efforts	is	an	expansive	logic,	which	operates	under	appropriate	conditions	to	ex-
tend	continually	the	range	of	activities	under	international	jurisdiction”	(2001,	p.	49).	With	regards	
to	the	Caribbean	these	conditions	may	include	a	fear	of	further	U.S.A	dominance	and	hence	a	need	
to	integrate	as	a	form	of	buffer.	Knight	and	Persaud	also	argue	that	once	the	integration	process	has	
begun	there	is	no	alternative	options	viable.	(Knight	&	Persaud,	2001,	pp.	48-49)	Some	evidence	in	
the	Caribbean	context	can	be	seen	in	the	evolvement	of	inter	Caribbean	cooperation	from	the	West	
Indian	Federation	to	the	Caribbean	Free	Trade	Association	and	finally	towards	the	CARICOM	and	its	
increasing	institutionalisation.	
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Historical	linkages	of	the	Caribbean	states	to	Africa	and	other	former	colonial	countries	make	it	im-
portant	to	take	note	on	the	South-South	aspect	of	Caribbean	Integration	movement.	Michelle	Mo-
rais	de	Sá	Silva	has	recognized	three	phases	in	the	evolution	of	South-South	cooperation	since	the	
World	War	II.	Firstly,	the	‘self-reliance	and	political	strengthening’	during	cold	war	decolonization	
struggles	(1949-79),	secondly	the	‘demobilization’	during	the	neoliberal	counter	offensive	from	the	
west	(1980-1998)	and	thirdly	the	latest	South-South	cooperation	as	‘best	practice	transfer’.	Addi-
tionally,	she	points	out	that	whilst	cooperation	is	a	voluntary	process,	transfer	may	entail	both	vol-
untary	and	coercive	processes	(Jules	&	Morais	de	Sá	e	Silva,	2008,	p.	58).	Knight	and	Persaud	con-
clude	that	future	appearance	of	the	indigenous	Caribbean	security	governance	is	likely	due	to	“the	
history	of	the	region	and	the	 impact	of	global	 forces	that	have	been	pushing	states	 into	regional	
trading	blogs”	(2001,	p.	50).	While	much	of	the	integration	and	regionalism	literature	is	based	on	the	
economical	projects,	and	to	the	change	brought	upon	the	global	markets	by	the	end	of	Cold	War,	
some	attention	is	also	given	to	the	security	cooperation.	
	
1.2 Security	Theory	
The	question	of	security	is	related	the	question	what	and	who	is	the	subject	of	security	is	part	of	the	
debate	between	realism	and	liberalism.	This	section	will	present	the	discourse	over	what	is	security	
from	the	perspective	of	security	studies,	defining	security	in	the	necessary	accuracy	for	the	study	is	
important	as	well	as	discussing	the	relevancy	of	modern	broad	security	threats	to	the	Caribbean	
states.		
	
The	traditional	Security	approach	emphasises	the	importance	of	traditional	military	understanding	
of	security	and	the	power	commodities	that	can	be	used	by	states	to	secure	themselves.	Griffith	calls	
this	as	‘diplomatic-strategic	conception	of	security’	that	takes	the	assumption	that	there	are	external	
hostile	and	violent	threat	that	are	seen	in	military	form.	(Griffith,	1990,	p.	10)	The	idea	of	national	
security,	defined	in	militarized	terms,	 largely	dominated	the	security	studies	during	the	Cold	War	
era.		This	thinking	was	based	on	the	realist	theory	(see	Morgenthau,	1966).	Others	have	later	argued	
(Buzan,	1991;	Byron,	1997;	Knight	&	Persaud,	2001;	Griffith,	1998,	2004)	that	the	utility	of	this	un-
derstanding	has	decreased	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	Cold	War.	 John	Baylis	argues	 that	 integration	
projects,	such	as	the	one	in	Europe,	undermine	the	classical	political	order,	while	at	the	same	time	
Jouni	Montonen	 Master’s	Thesis	 University	of	Tampere	
	 9	
fragmentation	of	Soviet	Union	and	Yugoslavia	has	created	problems	with	boundaries,	minorities.	
There	is	then	an	argument	to	be	made	that	“ethno-national	groups,	rather	than	states	should	be-
come	the	centre	of	attention	for	security	analysts.”	(Baylis,	2011,	p.	233)	This	 is	undermining	the	
priority	of	a	state	as	the	subject	of	security	and	it	could	be	argued	that	this	is	particularly	for	the	
small	state	understanding	of	security.	The	increased	destructive	capabilities	and	the	nuclear	deter-
rence	during	great	power	rivalry	seems	to	have	given	space	for	other	understandings	of	security.	
This	has	enabled	the	small	Caribbean	states	to	adopt	more	critical	understanding	of	security	while	
maintaining	some	aspects	of	traditional	approach.		
	
1.3 Critical	security	theory	
The	whole	concept	of	security	has	been	under	scrutiny	from	the	1980’s	and	especially	after	the	Cold	
War.	The	critical	security	studies	have	become	more	significant	as	they	question	what	is	security,	
and	who	is	to	be	secured.	The	21st	century	challenges,	which	modern	states	are	faced	with,	come	in	
many	forms	and	are	often	 intertwined	with	each	other	by	nature.	Richard	Bloomfield	states	that	
“new	security	threats	are,	as	often	as	not,	the	results	of	decisions	taken	by	non-state	actors,	the	
threatening	activities	are	transnational,	that	is,	they	cross	boarders,	but	may	be	difficult	for	the	state	
to	control”	(1998,	p.	122).	Barry	Buzan	has	noted	the	continuing	debate	between	the	traditionalist-
,	widening-	and	critical	approaches	to	security	studies.	The	traditionalists	argue	on	behalf	of	the	mil-
itary	security	while	 the	widening	approach	 is	beginning	to	 take	 into	account	 in	some	new	threat	
aspects	such	as	economic	and	environmental	the	traditional	subject	of	security,	state.	The	critical	
approaches	then	include	number	of	different	approaches	such	as	feminists,	poststructuralist,	and	
critical	theory.	The	main	contribution	of	the	critical	approaches	is	to	question	the	subject	of	security.	
(Buzan,	1997;	Baylis,	2011)	
	
A	concept	of	‘securitization’	has	been	developed	by	the	Copenhagen	school	of	security	studies	up-
holding	a	constructivist	approach	and	presented	in	19981,	and	it	is	important	for	the	study	as	it	will	
be	relevant	from	the	aspect	of	security	studies	but	also	on	the	view	point	of	foreign	policy	analysis	
as	securitization	influences	the	policy	actions.	It	questions	how	different	threats	are	constructed	in	
																																																						
1 See Buzan B, Waever O, de Wilde J (1998): Security: a new framework for analysis, Lynne Rienner. 
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public	discussion	and	how	they	are	prioritized.	Making	something	a	matter	of	national	security,	thus	
securitizing	the	issue,	it	gains	special	focus	and	often	becomes	subject	to	different	legislation	and	
gives	authorities	greater	powers	and	extraordinary	measures	beyond	normal.	(Williams,	2003;	Ibek,	
2015).	After	the	end	of	Cold	War	and	the	collapse	of	super	power	rivalry	the	focus	of	security	in	the	
Caribbean	states	changed	responsively.	The	Washington	constructed	threat	of	communism	fell	giv-
ing	 space	 for	new	constructs,	Richard	Bloomfield	 (1998,	p.	 121)	notes	 that	 in	 the	Caribbean	 the	
“transformation	of	the	security	debate	obeys	two	fundamental	changes	in	the	international	situa-
tion:	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War	and	 the	economical	and	psychological	effects	of	 the	 technological	
revolution”.	This	is	supported	by	the	Byron’s	recognition	that	“in	the	post-Cold	War	era,	there	has	
been	widespread	recognition	of	the	need	to	redefine	security	and	to	reassess	the	principal	sources	
of	threat	to	international	community,	states	and	individuals”	(1997,	p.	54),	this	highlights	the	change	
in	the	understanding	of	security.		
	
1.4 Security	today		
The	subject	of	security	has	changed	from	state	centric,	to	include	international	community	as	well	
as	the	individual	and	the	sources	of	threats	may	be	other	than	just	hostile	states.	Harlan	Koff,	for	
example,	defines	security	“as	protection	from	harm”	and	differentiates	“hard	security”	“as	protec-
tion	 from	coercion-based	 threats”	 and	 “soft	 security”	 “as	protection	 against	 non-coercion-based	
threats”.	 (2016,	pp.	2-3)	He	also	defines	environmental	security	as	the	“protection	from	environ-
mental	dangers,	 the	 lack/depletion	of	 strategic	 resources	and	conflict	over	 these	 resources”	and	
human	security	as	“protection	of	human	dignity”	which	is	a	combination	of	both	hard	and	soft	secu-
rity	measures	(Koff,	2016,	p.	3).		Others	have	suggested	an	approach	which	would	take	into	account	
military,	political,	ecological	and	the	ethnic	protracted	social	conflict	aspects	leading	to	the	“multi-
dimensional	approach”.	(Griffith,	1990,	p.	12.)	The	change	in	the	security	debate	has	led	to	the	situ-
ation	where	“concerns	about	regional	security	have	shifted	from	strategic-military	issues	to	police	
and	intelligence	matters”	(Serbin,	1998,	p.	63).	Rothstein’s	theory,	presented	by	Griffith,	focuses	on	
third	world	countries	and	according	to	him	their	security	challenges	are	related	to	problems	of	de-
velopment	and	that	the	common	features	among	the	two	are	influenced	by	threat	perceptions,	re-
source	constraints	and	legitimacy.	(Griffith,	1990,	p.	12)	These	changes	are	framing	the	study,	as	the	
regional	security	 in	the	Caribbean,	 is	consisting	of	small,	developing	and	heterogeneous	group	of	
states	which	contain	different	levels	of	different	threats	when	compared	
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the	world.	How	different	matters	have	been	prioritised	and	securitized	trough	different	times	is	dis-
cussed	in	chapter	three.		
	
1.5 The	research	question	and	its	relevancy	
The	 focus	of	 this	 research	 is	 in	 the	external	dimension	of	 security	of	 small	Caribbean	states,	 the	
development	of	shared	understanding	of	external	security	and	therefore	the	internal	domestic	soci-
oeconomic	aspects	of	individual	countries,	though	they	are	interacting	with	the	external	threats,	are	
not	of	primary	concern.	Crime	and	economic	inequality	are	a	matter	of	great	concern	to	many	Car-
ibbean	states	and	their	impact	has	been	studied	before2,	instead	the	focus	is	on	the	threats	formed	
by	external	 forces.	To	understand	the	drivers	of	security	 integration	 in	 the	Caribbean	today,	one	
must	begin	by	looking	at	history	to	see	what	has	been	done	before	and	how	the	understanding	of	
security	has	changed	trough	the	colonial	era,	and	the	age	of	neo-imperialism	of	the	U.S.A,	and	dawn-
ing	of	the	independency	of	the	Caribbean,	U.S.	hegemony	trough	the	Cold	War,	unipolar	moment	
after	the	Cold	War	and	trough	the	dawn	of	the	new	millennium.	The	Caribbean	has	been	often	con-
sidered	as	one	of	the	most	democratic	and	peaceful	region	in	the	world	and	studying	a	such	region	
could	provide	new	understandings	that	are	much	needed	in	the	modern	world.		
	
	Jessica	Byron	(1997)	has	identified	four	phases	in	the	security	integration	between	1960s	and	1990s	
among	the	Eastern	Caribbean	States.	However,	from	the	1990s	there	has	been	a	significant	move	
for	greater	cooperation	in	the	security	sector	within	the	whole	CARICOM.	It	has	been	unclear	what	
is	driving	the	need	for	security	cooperation	between	the	small	Caribbean	states	today,	whether	the	
integration	movement	is	indeed	internal	to	the	Caribbean	region	and	is	driven	by	local	needs,	or	is	
it	externally	driven	by	the	needs	and	demands	of	 foreign	powers.	 In	this	study,	 I	will	expand	the	
Jessica	Byron’s	recognition	of	four	phases	and	argue	that	there	is	a	new	distinct	phase	to	be	identi-
fied	in	security	development	of	the	Caribbean.	To	describe	the	phenomenon	of	security	cooperation	
it	is	necessary	ask,	how	and	why	do	these	states	cooperate,	and	how	the	rationale	behind	the	coop-
eration	has	evolved.	Jessica	Byron	has	identified	four	phases	in	the	Eastern	Caribbean	States	security	
																																																						
2	See:	UNDP	Caribbean	Human	Development	Report	2012,	2016;	World	Bank	report	37820:	Crime	
Violence	and	Development,	2007;	 Inter-American	Development	Bank:	Crime	and	Violence	 in	 the	
Caribbean	2015,	
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cooperation	and	this	thesis	has	expanded	that	to	the	CARICOM	context	and	identified	a	new	and	
distinct	phase	which	can	to	be	added	to	Jessica	Byron’s	work.		The	dominant	assumption	in	the	field	
is	that	the	increase	in	security	cooperation	in	the	Caribbean	Community	is	due	to	the	increase	of	
transnational	crime,	but	it	is	unclear	to	what	extend	this	is	also	due	to	the	involvement	of	the	tradi-
tional	security	providers,	the	old	colonial	hosts	and	the	U.S.A.	in	the	region.	
	
The	research	question	is	then	shaped	as	follows:	What	has	led	to	the	deepening	of	the	CARICOM	
security	cooperation?	The	hypothesis	is	that	the	due	to	small	military	capabilities	small	Caribbean	
states	have	succeeded	in	developing	common	security	perception	that	has	displaced	the	traditional	
military	security.				
The	secondary	aim	of	 the	research	 is	 to	 identify	a	new	and	distinct	phase	of	security	 integration	
happening	in	the	Caribbean.		
	
1.6 The	Structure	of	the	thesis		
The	purpose	of	this	case	study	is	to	describe	the	process	of	increasing	security	cooperation	in	the	
Caribbean	Community	ultimately	leading	to	the	addition	of	security	as	the	fourth	pillar	of	the	com-
munity	and	to	understand	what	led	to	the	change	from	a	‘go	alone’	approach	towards	increasing	
cooperation.		The	first	introduced	the	reader	to	the	topic,	theoretical	debates	over	security,	region-
alization	and	why	and	how	states	cooperate,	and	 the	concept	of	 security	 itself	and	 the	 research	
question	of	this	study.	The	second	chapter	explains	the	approach	and	methodology	used	in	this	study	
while	the	chapter	three	then	moves	to	chronologically	reveal	the	development	of	security	coopera-
tion	within	the	Caribbean	since	the	1960s	when	the	islands	began	to	gain	their	independencies.	Jes-
sica	Byron’s	recognition	of	different	phases	in	eastern	Caribbean	security	cooperation	comes	rele-
vant	here	and	I	take	her	notion	and	expand	it	to	the	entire	CARICOM	context.	The	aim	in	chapter	
three	is	to	identify	the	dominant	threats,	and	actors	in	the	four	phases.	The	following,	fourth	chapter	
will	then	provide	evidence	to	support	the	hypothesis	that	there	is	a	fifth	phase	to	be	identified	and	
discuss	the	development	of	CARICOM	security	integration	in	the	2000s.		The	final	discussions	will	
conclude	the	findings,	summarise	the	study	and	identify	new	research	areas	that	could	be	of	interest	
in	the	future.		
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2. Chapter	2:	 Methodology	
	
This	thesis	is	seeking	to	discover	what	led	to	the	appearance	of	security	as	the	fourth	pillar	of	the	
CARICOM.	There	are	however	very	limited	number	of	regional	organisations	with	that	level	of	inte-
gration	existing,	which	makes	comparative	studies	difficult.	The	development	of	EU	Common	Secu-
rity	and	Defence	Policy	could	provide	one,	it	is	however	placed	against	very	different	historical	back-
ground	making	comparisons	challenging.	To	answer	my	research	question,	 I	have	chosen	to	do	a	
case	study	on	the	development	of	security	discourse	in	the	Caribbean.	A	major	advantage	of	using	a	
case	study	on	a	topic	such	as	this,	as	Eckstein	argues,	is	that	case	studies	are	most	valuable	at	the	
stage	at	which	theories	are	tested,	and	this	is	particularly	true	in	the	macro	political	level	(Eckstein,	
2009).	In	general,	a	case	study	explores	a	certain	case	or	phenomena	trough	investigating	multiple	
sources	of	information	and	then	produces	narrative	describing	the	case	and	involves	intimate	famil-
iarity	with	that	case.	(Paterson,	2010;	Cresswell,	2007,	pp.	73-77)	To	answer	to	my	research	question	
I	will	use	the	within	case	study	to	compare	the	discourse	over	security	at	different	periods.	Benefit	
of	this,	more	specifically	is	that	the	“aim	of	within	case	analysis	in	in-depth	understanding	and	de-
scription	of	the	phenomenon	under	study”	(Paterson,	2010,	p.	971).	Thus,	doing	a	case	study	is	justi-
fied	in	this	case	as	it	can	be	seen	not	only	as	a	methodology	but	as	a	strategy,	as	well	as	the	final	
product	of	the	study.		
	
To	some	extend	I	will	also	utilise	historical	methods,	which	are	often	used	inside	history	departments	
to	understand	how	a	certain	phenomenon	developed	in	historical	context	and	in	the	field	of	social	
studies,	a	single	country	is	the	most	common	unit	of	analysis,	while	some	select	sub	regions	within	
a	country,	but	also	supra	entities	such	as	the	European	Union	(Lange,	2014).	My	focus	in	this	study	
will	be	on	the	supra	entity	level,	as	the	focus	is	on	the	CARICOM,	and	to	lesser	extend	the	Regional	
Security	System	but	also	in	state	level	considerations.	The	discourse	will	utilise	causal	narrative	as	it	
“is	an	excellent	method	for	analysing	complex	processes	and	concepts,	as	it	allows	detail	and	a	more	
holistic	analysis	that	considers	multiple	factors	as	well	as	their	interactions	and	sequencing.	It	is	par-
ticularly	suitable	for	exploratory	studies	and	is	capable	of	providing	considerable	insight	into	causal	
mechanisms.”	(Lange,	2014,	p.	45)	
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By	using	a	case	study	approach,	I	will	discuss	how	the	discourse	between	realism	and	liberalism	has	
affected	the	development	of	security	in	the	Caribbean.	I	will	argue	that	both	theories	have	had	their	
impact	on	the	Caribbean.	Additionally,	the	theory	of	securitization	discussed	earlier,	becomes	rele-
vant	here.	Despite	that	the	theory	was	only	presented	in	1998,	it	can	be	applied	back	into	history	as	
well.	How	different	threats	have	been	prioritised	and	how	the	threats	to	the	national	securities	of	
the	Caribbean	states	has	changed.		
		
2.1. Research	Material	
While	researching	this	topic	I	completed	a	student	exchange	program	at	the	University	of	West	In-
dies	 in	Cave	Hill	campus	at	Barbados,	and	a	dive	master	 internship	 in	the	British	Virgin	 Islands	 in	
Autumn	2016.	These	experiences	gave	me	some	deeper	understanding	of	the	Caribbean	way	of	life	
and	every	day	aspects	of	security	in	the	region.		However,	this	thesis	is	not	based	on	anthropological	
approaches,	but	 the	 impact	of	having	 lived	 in	 the	region	 is	still	 considered.	 Instead,	 this	 thesis	 is	
largely	based	on	document	analysis,	and	the	documents	in	this	case	include:	records,	maps,	minutes	
of	meetings,	journals,	annual	reports,	articles,	policies,	legal	documents,	intergovernmental	organi-
sation’s	resolutions,	news	articles	and	speeches.	
	
	There	are	however	some	problems	which	may	have	influenced	the	study	since,	as	Hurworth	lists,	
documents	may	be	misleading,	unclear,	not	detailed,	inappropriate	selections	may	be	made,	docu-
ments	that	are	available	may	be	unrepresentative	and	the	comprehending	the	why	and	how	the	
documents	were	originally	produced	(Hurworth,	2003).	The	choice	to	use	existing	documents	is	due	
to	their	availability	and	accessibility	for	the	author	trough	open	channels	and	the	library	accesses	of	
the	Universities	of	Tampere	and	West	Indies.	Differing	from	the	original	research	plan,	a	decision	
was	made	not	to	commit	myself	to	 interviews.	The	professionals	and	academics	relevant	for	this	
study,	were	preoccupied	with	their	own	tasks	and	not	available	without	extensive	traveling,	inter-
views	 were	 excluded	 from	 the	 data	 collection	 methods.	 Separation	 to	 primary	 and	 secondary	
sources	needs	also	be	clarified,	primary	sources	are	in	this	case	used	to	refer	to	texts	“written	by	the	
people	directly	involved	and	at	the	time	contemporary	with	the	period	being	investigated”	as	defined	
by	Finnegan.	(Finnegan,	2006)	This	however	in	my	case	also	includes	official	documents	by	govern-
ments	and	INGO’s.	Secondary	sources	then	are	the	documents	interpreting	and	referring	to	the	pri-
mary	sources.		
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The	main	disadvantage	of	using	these	methods	in	this	case	study,	however,	is	the	challenge	of	uni-
versalising	the	results.	To	what	extend	the	findings	of	this	thesis	can	be	generalised	to	other	cases	is	
disputable.	Much	of	this	is	due	to	the	uniqueness	of	modern	regionalisation	processes	and	to	the	
specificity	of	the	case	studied.	Some	aspects	are	common	with	other	integration	projects	but	many	
of	the	challenges	faced	by	the	small	Caribbean	island	states	make	this	study	unique	in	its	own	setting.		
The	decision	was	made	to	focus	on	the	external	threats	and	therefor	discussion	over	internal	socio-
economic	and	political	conditions	and	threats	rising	from	within	is	limited	in	this	thesis.		
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3. Chapter:		 Caribbean	Security		
3.1. Background	
The	West	 Indies	were	colonialized	relatively	early,	already	 in	the	15th	and	16th	centuries,	and	the	
European	colonisers	nearly	exterminated	the	local	inhabitants	known	as	Caribs	and	Taíno	Arawaks	
partly	by	forced	labour	and	partly	by	introducing	new	diseases	to	the	region.	The	few	survivors	mixed	
with	the	slaves	brought	by	the	colonizers	as	the	extinction	of	the	local	population	led	to	a	shortage	
of	labour	force	which	in	turn	increased	the	slave	trade	to	the	region	(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	pp.	146-
147).		However,	as	the	colonialism	spread	through	the	world,	especially	to	the	far	East	and	Africa,	
the	significance	of	West	indies	colonies	declined	particularly	for	the	United	Kingdom,	France	and	the	
Netherlands	making	space	for	the	U.S	to	become	the	dominant	power	in	the	region.	Especially	in	the	
first	decades	of	the	20th	century	the	American	economic	interest	in	the	Latin	America	and	the	Carib-
bean	grew	introducing	a	new	phenomenon:	“as	the	economic	interests	of	U.S.	business	extended	
into	these	regions,	so	too	did	their	stake	in	political	stability.	When	that	stability	appeared	tenuous	
and	investments	were	in	jeopardy,	the	U.S.	government	was	not	hesitant	to	deploy	gunboats	and	
marines	to	protect	them”	(LeoGrande,	1998,	p.	12).	This	was	a	result	of	the	Monroe	doctrine	dated	
back	to	1823,	which	was	aimed	on	decreasing	the	influence	of	European	powers	and	prevent	them	
from	recolonising	the	western	hemisphere.	There	was	a	fear	among	the	American	people	that	that	
the	economic	crisis	 in	Latin	America	 in	early	1900s	would	 launch	European	recolonization	as	 the	
British,	German	and	 Italian	gunboats	had	already	blockaded	the	ports	of	economically	defaulting	
Venezuela	 in	 1902.	 (U.S.	National	Archives	&	Records	Administration,	 2017)	 President	Roosevelt	
stated	in	the	Corollary	of	December	1904	that	in	case	any	state	in	the	Americas	would	default	on	
their	debts	or	refuse	to	fulfil	their	obligations	to	international	creditors	“in	the	Western	Hemisphere	
the	adherence	of	the	United	States	to	the	Monroe	Doctrine	may	force	the	United	States,	however	
reluctantly,	in	flagrant	cases	of	such	wrongdoing	or	impotence	to	the	exercise	of	international	police	
power”	(Roosevelt,	1904).	This	role	of	international	police	would	later	result	in	several	interventions	
for	other	reasons	as	well.		
	
The	role	of	Caribbean	islands	was	firstly	to	act	as	a	bridge	head	for	the	European	powers	on	their	
way	to	conquer	the	rest	of	the	Americas,	then	as	the	‘vortex	of	the	Americas,’	as	the	Cuban	writer	
Jóse	Márti	called	it,	the	bridge	between	the	North	and	South	America,	highlighting	their	strategically	
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important	location.	The	proximity	of	the	Latin	America	is	important	for	the	Caribbean	states’	security	
as	well.	The	example	of	Latin	American	states	meeting	 in	the	Congress	of	Panama	in	1826	under	
Simón	Bolivar	“for	a	purpose	of	forming	a	confederation	and	providing	mutual	defence	against	at-
tacks	(particularly	by	Spain)”	(Finne	More	&	Jurkovich,	2014,	p.	364)	The	sovereign	equality	of	states	
is	an	idea	which	can	be	tracked	to	the	‘International	Conference	of	American	States’	held	in	the	US	
in	1888,	more	than	to	Europe.	The	notable	difference,	however	is	the	late	independency	of	the	Car-
ibbean.	The	Latin	American	countries	gained	their	independencies	in	the	early	19th	century,	begin-
ning	with	Mexico	1810,	whereas	the	Caribbean	island	states,	with	the	exemption	of	Haiti	in	1804,	
only	became	independent	from	1960’s	onwards.		However,	the	idea	of	sovereignty	and	equality	is	
deeply	rooted	in	the	Caribbean	and	the	early	independency	of	the	continental	Caribbean	inspired	
the	island	states.	Unlike	the	Latin	American	states,	during	the	colonial	period,	the	island	states	in	the	
Caribbean	were	highly	separated	from	each	other	to	support	the	divide	and	rule	method	used	by	
the	European	colonial	powers	and	this	has	made	the	ideology	of	‘pan-caribbeanism’	a	weak	one	even	
to	date,	as	each	state	continues	to	safeguard	its	national	sovereignty	jealously	from	each	other’s.	
Especially	the	colonies	of	the	British	empire	had	very	little	to	do	with	each	other	as	during	the	colo-
nial	era,	they	were	run	by	governors	who	had	to	run	all	their	interactions	with	the	other	colonies	
trough	the	colonial	office	in	London.	To	what	extend	the	isolation	of	Caribbean	states	has	affected	
on	the	stability	of	their	democracy	and	governance	which	differs	from	the	Latin	American	countries	
is	unclear.		
	
	The	idea	of	creating	Caribbean	federations	arise	in	the	20th	century	while	the	Colonial	powers	fo-
cused	to	what	they	considered	more	economically	and	strategically	important	colonies	in	Asia	and	
Africa.	It	was	thought	at	the	time	by	the	colonial	powers,	that	the	small	islands	should	be	united	to	
create	larger	more	economically	sustainable	entities	that	can	defend	themselves.	This	idea	of	feder-
alisation	was	also	seen	in	the	French	attempts	to	create	federations	in	Western	and	Central	Africa.	
In	the	British	Caribbean,	two	units	were	created:	The	Windward	Islands	Federation,	which	only	lasted	
from	1879	to	1883;	and	the	Leeward	Islands	Federation	which	 lasted	much	 longer,	 from	1871	to	
1958.	The	later	was	followed	by	the	British	West	Indian	Federation	from	1958	to	1962.	(Baird,	2011,	
p.	19)	Oostinde	and	Klinkers	however	note	that	“these	 island	economies,	with	their	 limited	 local	
markets,	a	narrow	range	of	economic	activities	and	without	natural	resources	were	competitive	ra-
ther	than	complementary	and	thus	remained	largely	insular”	(2003,	p.	21).	This	ultimately	led	to	the	
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collapse	of	the	federation	as	the	Caribbean	countries	led	by	Jamaica	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	choose	
to	leave	the	federation	and	become	independent	individually	in	1962.	Some	claim	that	this	was	due	
to	the	prevailing	‘colonial	nature’	of	the	West	Indian	Federation	which	was	heavily	sponsored	by	the	
British.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	p.	229)	However,	many	newly	independent	states	in	the	area	where	the	
West	 Indian	Federation	previously	stood,	and	soon	formed	the	Caribbean	Free	Trade	Association	
CARIFTA	 in	1967,	to	continue	the	 intention	to	create	greater	economical	block.	Following	this,	 in	
1973	the	first	treaty	of	Chaguaramas	officially	announced	the	creation	of	the	Caribbean	Community,	
CARICOM.	Some	institutions,	such	as	the	secretariat	and	Caribbean	development	bank	established	
in	the	CARIFTA	context	were	inherited	to	the	CARICOM.	This	in	in	coherence	with	the	neofunction-
alism	presented	earlier.		
Table	1	CARICOM	Members	
Member	State	
CARICOM	
membership	
Former	Colony	of	 Member	State	
CARICOM	
membership	
Former	Colony	of	
Antigua	and	Bar-
buda	
1974	 United	Kingdom	 Jamaica	 1973	 United	Kingdom	
Bahamas	 1983	 United	Kingdom	 Montserrat	 1974	 United	Kingdom	
Barbados	 1973	 United	Kingdom	 Saint	Lucia	 1974	 United	Kingdom	
Belize	 1974	 United	Kingdom	 St	Kits	and	Nevis	 1974	 United	Kingdom	
Dominica	 1974	 France	 St	Vincent	and	the	
Grenadines	
1974	 United	Kingdom	
Grenada	 1974	 United	Kingdom	 Suriname	 1995	 The	Netherlands	
Guyana	 1973	 United	Kingdom	 Trinidad	and	Tobago	 1973	 United	Kingdom	
Haiti	 2002	 France	
	
Table	2	CARICOM	associate	states	
	
	
Associate	Members	 Year	Accepted	
Anguilla	 1999	
Bermuda	 2003	
Turks	and	Caicos	Islands	 1991	
British	Virgin	Islands	 1991	
Cayman	Islands	 2002	
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In	the	early	independent	years	of	the	Caribbean	island	states,	the	old	European	Colonial	powers	and	
the	U.S.A	were	often	responsible	for	the	external	security	of	the	small	islands.	Therefore,	there	was	
a	little	need	for	any	deeper	security	cooperation	among	the	islands	until	the	end	of	Cold	War.	This	
was	then	followed	by	a	period	of	global	U.S.A.	hegemony	leading	to	today’s	increasing	multi-polarity	
of	the	world	and	to	the	proliferation	of	international	violence	to	non-state	actors	and	globalization	
of	economy,	leading	to	a	situation	where	the	attention	of	the	powerful	states	and	former	colonial	
hosts	is	now	shifting	from	one	conflict	to	another.	Today,	13	of	the	15	member	states	of	CARICOM	
are	Anglophone,	with	latest	members,	Suriname	being	a	Dutch	speaking	and	Haiti	being	a	Franco-
phone	country.	(Luxner,	1999)	The	community	has	a	combined	population	of,	approximately	13,3	
million	people	and	a	gross	domestic	product	of	$28.198	billion	making	it,	 in	economic	terms,	the	
smallest	regional	 integration	group	in	the	western	hemisphere.	Combining	these	factors	with	the	
strong	historical	ties	of	the	member	states	to	the	U.K,	France	and	the	Netherlands,	the	political	and	
economic	security	environment	 is	particularly	challenging	for	the	CARICOM	countries.	 (Sandberg,	
Seale,	&	Taylor,	2006)		
	
The	 fading	 interest	 of	 the	 former	 colonial	 hosts,	 geopolitical	 changes,	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	war	
against	terror,	and	the	economic	rise	of	the	BRICS3	countries	has	had	its	impact	in	the	Caribbean	as	
well	as	elsewhere	in	the	world.	Indeed,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	greatest	change	in	Latin	America	
and	the	Caribbean	since	the	Cold	War,	then	is	the	emergence	of	Brazil	as	an	increasingly	influential	
power.	(Bishop,	Clegg,	&	Rosemarijn,	2017,	p.	2)	For	the	small	states	in	the	Caribbean	all	of	this	has	
meant	that	they	have,	and	are	increasingly	looking	for	closer	cooperation	among	themselves	as	a	
source	of	security.	One	of	the	significant	marks	for	this	was	in	2013,	when	CARICOM	adopted	its	first	
Common	Crime	and	Security	Policy.	This	is	to	some	extend	following	the	example	laid	out	by	the	EU	
in	the	Maastricht	Treaty	already	in	1993,	but	nonetheless	the	first	common	security	policy	marks	the	
dawning	of	deeper	integration	among	the	CARICOM	members.	
	
																																																						
3	Brazil,	Russia,	India,	China	and	South	Africa	
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3.2. 	Development	of	Caribbean	Security:		Four	Phases	of	Security	
The	Caribbean	states	are	defined	by	their	physical	location,	at	the	crossing	of	tectonic	plates	they	
have	a	tendency	of	earth	quakes	and	volcanic	eruptions,	they	are	also	on	the	path	of	hurricanes	and	
other	severe	weather	conditions	due	to	the	oceanic	currents.	This	dimension	of	physical	location	has	
however	had	different	meanings	at	different	times,	the	weather	patterns	are	changing	as	well	due	
to	climate	change	and	this	has	impacted	the	security	understanding.		Jessica	Byron	distinguishes	four	
phases	of	security	consciousness	development	in	the	Regional	Security	System	formed	by	the	East-
ern	Caribbean	states	and	Barbados	(Byron,	1997).	In	the	section	below,	I	will	take	the	four	phases	
recognized	by	Byron	and	expand	her	work	by	identifying	the	characteristics	and	dominant	threats	of	
these	phases	and	extend	the	argument	to	the	CARICOM	wide	context.	In	general,	how	the	different	
matters	have	become	threats	and	how	some	aspects	have	been	securitized	in	different	times	has	
varied	and	there	appears	to	be	a	move	from	the	early	liberal	thinking	in	the	Caribbean	during	the	
first	phase	towards	more	realist	security	paradigm	in	the	second	and	third	phase.	Fourth	phase	will	
again	diffuse	the	security	perceptions	of	these	two	approaches.	
	
3.2.1. Phase	I:		A	New	hope	of	international	law	(1960-1973)	
The	first	phase	is	the	dawning	of	independency	following	the	withdrawal	of	colonial	European	pow-
ers,	especially	Great	Britain.	From	the	security	perspective,	from	1960s	to	1970s	the	focus	was	on	
the	small	size	and	the	 internal	viability	of	state	economically	and	politically.	The	focus	was	more	
internally	orientated	as	especially	in	multi-island	states;	the	risk	of	secession	was	imminent	and	very	
little	thought	was	given	to	external	threats	(Byron,	1997).	Barry	Bartman’s	article	‘meeting	the	needs	
of	microstate	security’	(2002)	discusses	how	the	small	states	can	meet	the	vital	requirements	set	by	
the	anarchical	international	arena	and	defend	their	independence	and	maintain	their	legal	person-
ality.	He	argues	that	during	the	19th	and	20th	centuries	the	state	was	defined	by	its	power	to	make	
war	by	claiming	that	“if	a	state	lost	its	power	to	make	war,	it	lost	its	sovereignty”	(2002,	p.	362).	This	
meant	that	the	small	states,	which	often	lack	military	capabilities,	are	acutely	vulnerable	not	only	to	
other	states	but	also	to	threats	from	other	sources.	The	principle	of	‘self-help’	came	upon	in	the	20th	
century	confirming	the	requirement	for	states	to	maintain	a	capability	to	defend	its	sovereignty	and	
this	was	also	set	in	the	international	obligations	set	out	by	intergovernmental	organisations	such	as	
the	League	of	Nations,	for	example	Liechtenstein	was	declined	entry	to	the	League	of	Nations	on	the	
basis	that	it	had	no	army.	Similar	questions	have	been	raised	later	based	on	the	Charter	of	the	United	
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Nations	which	requires	states	to	contribute	to	international	peace	and	security.	(Bartmann,	2002)	
All	though,	this	argument	can	be	countered	by	claiming,	as	that	by	not	having	an	army	small	states	
are	contributing	more	to	peace	than	big	states	with	their	massive	military	capabilities.	In	the	Carib-
bean,	many	of	the	new	states	saw	no	need	to	establish	military	institutions	in	the	first	place.	Barba-
dos,	for	example	had	no	military	institutions	at	the	time	of	independence	and	according	to	the	view	
of	Earl	Barrow,	the	prime	minister	at	the	time,	in	the	age	of	nuclear	weapons	no	country	could	ever	
claim	to	be	able	to	militarily	secure	themselves	and	saw	that	Barbados	had	no	significant	external	
threats	therefore	decided	not	to	establish	any	military	forces.	Later	under	his	rule,	the	Coast	Guard	
was	established	in	1974,	but	mainly	to	police	the	Barbadian	economic	zone.	(Bishop	,	2002,	p.	78)	
	
	Cedric	Grant	(2006)	writes	about	the	principle	of	non-intervention,	which	is	formalized	in	the	Article	
2.7	of	 the	Charter	of	 the	United	Nations,	 in	which	 it	 says	 that	“nothing	contained	 in	 the	present	
Charter	should	authorize	the	United	Nations	to	intervene	in	matters	which	are	essentially	within	the	
domestic	 jurisdiction	of	any	state...”	He	argues	that	due	to	the	geopolitical	 location	of	Caribbean	
countries	in	the	sphere	of	U.S.	influence,	they	adopted	the	state	centric	approach	which	insisted	on	
non-interference	 and	 non-intervention	 early	 on.	 Some	 reasons	 behind	 this	 may	 include	 the	 at-
tempted	US	sponsored	invasion	of	Cuba	in	the	Bay	of	Pigs	in	1961.	In,	1966	The	first	prime	minister	
of	Barbados	put	this	policy	in	to	words	in	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly:		
“We	have	no	quarrels	to	pursue	and	we	particularly	insist	that	we	do	not	regard	any	member	
state	as	our	natural	opponent.	We	shall	not	involve	ourselves	in	sterile	ideological	wrangling	
because	we	are	exponents	not	of	the	diplomacy	of	power	but	of	the	diplomacy	of	peace	and	
prosperity.	We	will	not	regard	any	great	power	as	necessarily	right	in	a	given	dispute	unless	
we	are	convinced	of	this,	yet	at	the	same	time	we	will	not	view	the	great	powers	with	peren-
nial	suspicion	merely	on	account	of	their	size,	their	wealth,	or	their	nuclear	potential.	We	are	
friends	of	all,	satellites	of	none.”	(Foreign	Ministry	of	Barbados,	2017.)		
The	Caribbean	nations	are	signatories	to	the	Inter-American	Treaty	of	Reciprocal	Assistance,	known	
as	the	Rio	Pact	of	1947,	in	which	the	contracting	parties	agree	to	refrain	from	threatening	or	using	
force	in	handling	international	relations	and	the	third	article	clearly	states:		
“The	High	Contracting	Parties	agree	that	an	armed	attack	by	any	State	against	an	American	
State	shall	be	considered	as	an	attack	against	all	 the	American	States	and,	consequently,	
each	one	of	the	said	Contracting	Parties	undertakes	to	assist	 in	meeting	the	attack	 in	the	
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exercise	of	the	inherent	right	of	individual	or	collective	self-defense	recognized	by	Article	51	
of	the	Charter	of	the	United	Nations.	“	(OAS,	1947.)		
In	the	early	years	of	their	independency,	the	Caribbean	states	relied	on	the	international	institutions	
and	governance	as	suggested	by	the	liberal	theory	and	trusted	their	national	security	and	sover-
eignty	to	be	secured	by	international	law	and	collective	security	arrangements.	This	differs	from	the	
view	of	the	U.S.A	which	had	under	President	Kennedy	attempted	an	invasion	to	Cuba	in	1961	to	
counter	the	1959	revolution	and	had	become	involved	in	Vietnam.		
	
The	growth	in	the	number	of	sovereign	states	appeared	at	the	same	time	as	the	awakening	of	com-
munist	movements	in	the	Americas,	(Guatemala	1954,	Colombia	1957,	Venezuela	1958,	and	Cuba	
1959)	and	therefore	the	U.S.	security	policy	in	the	1960s	“was	formulated	to	prevent	another	Cuba	
from	developing	in	the	Caribbean	“	(Bradley,	2004,	p.	19),	and	this	policy	carried	on	until	the	end	of	
Cold	War.	However,	there	were	also	other	reasons	for	the	growing	U.S.	 interests	in	the	region.	A	
RAND	corporation’s	study	from	1983,	lists	that	increased	U.S.	interest	were	caused	by	several	fac-
tors.	The	discovery	of	new	oil	fields	in	the	region,	and	that	40%	of	US	crude	oil	and	56%	of	refined	
petroleum	imports	originated	from	Caribbean	countries	not	being	the	smallest.	Also,	the	growing	
trade	made	the	region	strategically	increasingly	important,	between	1960	and	1979	the	U.S.	imports	
increased	218%	and	exports	251%.	Immigration	became	security	interest	for	the	U.S	in	the	20th	cen-
tury,	in	the	Caribbean	rapid	population	growth	and	young	age	structure	in	the	region	combined	with	
slow	economic	growth	is	caused	population	pressures	leading	to	increasing	immigration,	both	legal	
and	illegal.	The	increasing	Cuban	military	power	supported	by	the	U.S.S.R	left	Mexico	and	Venezuela	
unable	to	project	balanced	military	power	to	the	region.	Rand	Corporation	recognised	the	Cuban	
influence	on	U.S	policy	as	Cuba	was	also	seen	as	a	base	from	where	the	Soviet	power	was	projected	
to	the	region.	Somewhat	surprisingly,	the	U.S.	military	presence	declined	at	the	same	time,	it	plum-
meted	from	25,000	personnel	in	1968	to	15,688	in	1981.	Responsively	the	financial	U.S	security	as-
sistance	dropped	from	37million	in	1968	to	665,00	in	1980.	(Stodder	&	McCarthy,	1983)	Bradley	has	
also	identified	controlling	immigration	as	a	us	security	concern	from	the	1960s	onwards	but	she	also	
recognises	the	aspect	that	as	the	U.S.	 immigration	officials	welcomed	skilled	workers,	 it	caused	a	
‘brain	 drain’,	 the	 loss	 of	 highly,	 and	 expensively,	 educated	 persons,	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 countries	
(Bradley,	2004,	pp.	53-58).	This	highlights	 the	adversarial	but	also	 intertwined	nature	of	 security	
between	the	U.S.	and	the	Caribbean	countries.	
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Bradley	notes	that	during	the	1960s	the	use	and	cultivation	of	marijuana	appeared	in	the	Caribbean	
on	a	big	scale.	However,	the	roots	of	marijuana	date	back	to	the	1830s	is	a	part	of	the	sociocultural	
Caribbean	lifestyle	making	it	difficult	for	the	governments	to	control	it.	Also,	it	provided	financially	
tempting	possibilities	for	some	social	groups.	(Bradley,	2004,	p.	88)	The	appearance	of	drug	trade	
coexists	with	the	wakening	of	tourism	sector	in	the	Caribbean	and	the	expansion	of	legal	trade	with	
the	U.S.	again	bringing	out	the	difficulty	of	separating	different	security	interests	from	each	other.		
	
During	the	first	phase	CARIFTA	was	transformed	to	CARICOM,	which	however	suffered	from	internal	
differences.	When	the	bigger	CARICOM	countries	saw	that	it	was	beneficial	to	commit	themselves	
to	bilateral	agreements	instead	of	collective	bargaining,	they	took	advantage	of	it	causing	damage	
to	the	group.	Additionally,	defining	the	Caribbean	was	debated	among	the	regional	leaders,	for	ex-
ample	the	Eric	Williams,	a	prime	minister	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	excluded	Latin	America	and	south	
America	from	the	Caribbean	while	Jamaican	approach	highlighted	the	need	for	close	relationship	
with	Latin	America	due	to	their	geopolitical	affinity.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004)	
	
	At	the	first	phase,	the	newly	independent	Caribbean	states	searched	their	place	in	the	international	
arena.	Increasing	trade	and	the	appearance	of	tourism	facilitated	the	growth	of	drug	trade	in	the	
region	and	linked	the	Caribbean	security	to	the	global	financial	institutions.		The	Caribbean	under-
standing	of	security	at	the	time	was	driven	by	the	need	for	recognition	of	their	sovereignty,	non-
existence	of	external	threats,	and	the	battle	over	ideologies	embodied	in	the	Cold	War	rivalry	be-
tween	the	U.S	and	the	U.S.S.R.	From	the	first	stage,	Caribbean	states	had	high	respect	of	sovereignty	
and	 looked	 for	 the	 increasing	 international	governance	embodied	 in	 the	UN	and	OAS	 to	provide	
collective	defence	against	possible	aggressors	indicating	for	more	liberal	internationalist	thought	to	
be	dominant	among	 the	Caribbean	 leaders.	At	 the	 time	 the	U.S.	 leadership	however	were	more	
leaning	towards	realism	and	feared	the	domino	like	spread	of	communism.		
	
3.2.2. Phase	II:	Realism	strikes	back	(1973-1982)	
The	second	phase	began	in	the	1970s	when	the	security	understanding	evolved	rapidly	influenced	
by	the	attempted	coup	in	Dominica	(1978),	intercepted	mercenary	invasion	of	Barbados	(1978)	and	
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the	coup	in	Grenada	(1979).	The	evolving	understanding	of	external	threats	led	to	the	emergence	
of	the	Regional	Security	System	(RSS)	which	was	“intended	to	cover	a	whole	range	of	contingencies,	
including	natural	disasters	and	coast	guard	operations.	However,	in	this	phase	the	participating	gov-
ernments	were	concerned	primarily	with	domestic	instability	and	with	mercenaries.”	(Byron,	1997,	
p.	56)		The	change	in	security	understanding	during	the	second	phase	can	be	seen	clearly	in	the	case	
of	Barbados,	which	established	its	national	defence	forces	in	1979.	Three	main	factors	can	be	iden-
tified	leading	to	this	change;	Firstly,	Barbados	among	three	other	Caribbean	countries	established	
diplomatic	relations	with	Cuba,	which	the	U.S.	did	not	see	favourably.	In	October	6th,	1976,	an	Air	
Cubana	Airlines	jet	exploded	soon	after	it	departed	from	Barbados	killing	everyone	on	board.	This	
was	done	by	the	anti-Castro	operatives	which	had	ties	with	the	CIA	linking	the	U.S.A	in	the	case.		
Secondly,	the	rumours	of	intended	invasion	were	discovered	already	in	1976	and	thirdly,	the	coup	
in	Grenada.	(Bishop,	2002.)	The	coup	in	Grenada	was	mounted	by	only	forty-five	members	of	the	
Marxist	New	jewel	movement,	and	it	demonstrated	how	vulnerable	the	small	states	were,	reviving	
the	idea	of	regional	security	cooperation	which	had	become	frozen.	At	the	same	time	the	disagree-
ment	over	 the	Falkland	 Islands	escalated.	The	 impact	of	 the	Falkland’s	War	 in	1982	brought	 the	
small	state	security	as	well	as	the	security	of	the	Commonwealth	to	the	front	of	international	secu-
rity	debate.	At	the	same	time,	Venezuela	threateningly	mobilized	its	troops	to	the	Guyanese	border.	
Guyana	successfully	protested	in	the	international	arenas	such	as	the	UN	Security	Council	and	within	
the	Non-aligned	movement	that	forced	Venezuela	to	withdraw	and	thus	embarrassed.	Venezuela	
demobilized	its	troops	and	conflict	was	then	avoided.	(Bartmann,	2002)	The	tensions,	however,	pre-
vailed	and	would	appear	again	in	later	stage.		
	
The	freeze	in	the	CARICOM	integration	at	this	period	is	embodied	in	the	fact	that	from	1975	to	1982	
the	CARICOM	heads	of	states	did	not	meet.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	p.	244)	However,	the	sub	regional	
organisation	OECS	became	increasingly	active	as	the	Grenada	coup,	Falklands	War	and	increasing	
militarization	of	drug	trafficking	highlighted	their	vulnerabilities.	The	end	of	second	phase	then	saw	
the	move	for	sub-regional	security	alliances	and	the	Regional	Security	System	(RSS)	of	the	Eastern	
Caribbean	States	is	the	significant	one	in	the	Caribbean	context.	The	establishing	members	of	the	
RSS	were	four	members	of	the	OECS,	Antigua	and	Barbuda,	Dominica,	St	Lucia	and	St	Vincent	and	
the	Grenadines	together	with	Barbados	as	they	in	1982	wrote	a	memorandum	of	understanding	
(MOU)	promising	to	provide	for	“mutual	assistance	on	request”.	The	RSS	was	a	hybrid	organisation	
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and	entailed	both	military	and	police	units	with	the	intention	was	to	provide	rapid	response	capa-
bility	for	traditional	security	concerns.	(Baird,	2011)The	Memorandum	of	understanding	was	a	mu-
tual	defence	against	external	aggression	or	international	coup	attempts.	(Bryan,	1998)	The	purpose	
of	the	RSS	was	to	act	as	a	deterrence	and	a	trip	wire	for	foreign	support,	it	acknowledged	its	limita-
tions	by	stating	that		
“The	RSS	does	not	pretend	to	have	the	capacity	to	deter	or	defeat	any	large	scale	foreign	
aggression	against	any	of	its	members.	Should	such	an	attack	take	place	a	substantial	out-
side	support	would	be	essential”	(RSS	Staff,	1986).	
	While	the	member	states,	soon	after	the	establishment	of	RSS	after	facing	severe	financial	limita-
tions,	fell	behind	on	payments,	external	support	from	Canada,	UK,	and	the	U.S.	became	essential.	
(Griffith,	1992)	
	
Somewhat	 surprisingly,	 the	 second	 phase	 began	 to	 see	 the	 rise	 of	 realists	who	 viewed	 security	
trough	the	traditional	military	security	paradigm	and	the	erosion	of	non-interventionist	approach	
among	the	small	Caribbean	states.	The	realist	idea	for	the	need	for	the	small	states	to	become	ca-
pable	to	defend	themselves,	leading	to	the	establishment	of	military	instalments	in	many	Caribbean	
states,	rose	from	the	impotence	of	 international	governance	in	defending	small	states	during	the	
earlier	years	with	the	increasing	trend	of	using	proxy	wars	for	the	game	between	the	superpower	
rivalry.		The	second	phase	revealed	difficulty	of	collective	efforts	in	the	CARICOM	context	and	many	
states	preferred	the	‘go-alone’	approach	in	their	security	and	economic	development	while	the	East-
ern	Caribbean	states	increasingly	opted	for	collective	security.		Having	discouraged	the	international	
interventions	planned	to	Grenada	and	Dominica	after	the	1979	Coup	d’états	the	CARICOM	upheld	
its	tradition	for	state	sovereignty	and	respect	for	the	non-interference	principle.		All	this	would	how-
ever	change	in	the	next	phase.		
	
3.2.3. Phase	III:	Return	of	collective	security	(1982-1990)	
According	to	Byron,	the	third	phase	reflects	the	qualitative	change	in	security	climate	in	the	1980’s	
following	the	1983	counter	coup	in	Grenada	and	the	following	intervention	by	the	U.S.	and	Carib-
bean	allies.	From	the	US$	100,000	in	1982,	the	US	military	assistance	to	OECS	countries	rose	to	US$	
5.6	million	in	1985	and	this	caused	increase	in	the	degree	of	militarization.	In	the	latter	half	of	1980s	
there	was	some	confusion	among	the	RSS	members	concerning	the	level	of	military	infrastructure	
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that	was	required.	By	1987	Barbados	and	Antigua	were	only	ones	maintaining	military	forces	while	
the	others	had	paramilitary	units	in	the	police	force	and	coast	guards.	In	the	1980s	the	world’s	eco-
nomic	and	political	structures	began	a	significant	rearrangement	due	to	new	production	and	com-
munication	technologies,	and	this	even	the	developed	nations	began	to	seek	ways	for	increasing	
their	position.	The	way	forward	was	the	emergence	of	regional	trading	and	political	block	and	the	
idea	of	shared	sovereignty,	embodied	first	with	the	establishment	of	European	Community’s	Single	
Market	launched	in	1986.	(Byron,	1997)			
	
At	the	same	time	the	U.S.	understanding	of	the	threats	presented	by	Caribbean	begin	changing.		
Ronald	Reagan’s	speech	at	the	OAS	in	February	24th,	1982,	made	it	clear	that	the	U.S	would	be	using	
both	financial	and	military	means	to	boost	up	Caribbean	and	Latin	American	countries	resilience	
against	communism	and	the	reason	for	this,	in	his	own	words	was	that:		
“The	Caribbean	region	is	a	vital	strategic	and	commercial	artery	for	the	United	States.	Nearly	
half	of	our	trade,	two-thirds	of	our	imported	oil,	and	over	half	of	our	imported	strategic	min-
erals	pass	through	the	Panama	Canal	or	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	Make	no	mistake:	The	well-being	
and	security	of	our	neighbours	in	this	region	are	in	our	own	vital	interest.” (Reagan,	1982)	
Reagan	introduced	the	Caribbean	Basin	Initiative,	a	new	U.S.	foreign	policy	tool,	which	in	fact	was	a	
series	of	bilateral	agreements	with	regional	governments.	Later	followed	by	the	increasing	security	
assistance	the	CBI	and	other	alternatives	nearly	became	an	ideological	approach	promoting	liberal	
capitalism	in	the	region.		The	international	security	environment	also	evolved,	the	70s	and	80s	saw	
the	appearance	of	economic	warfare	methods	such	as	trade	embargos	to	destabilise	‘unacceptable	
governments’	such	as	the	left	leaning	government	of	Michael	Manley	in	Jamaica,	as	well	as	covert	
operations	by	the	CIA	and	MI5	to	 influence	elections	 in	places	such	as	Guyana.	The	U.S	security	
policy	 had	 become	 increasingly	 militarised	 against	 drug	 trafficking	 and	 the	 Drug	 Enforcement	
Agency,	DEA,	was	created	in	1973.	The	first	multilateral	anti-drug	operation	in	the	Caribbean	took	
place	in	1982	when	‘Operation	Bahamas	and	Turks	and	Caicos	Islands’	occurred.	These	operations	
were	committed	by	the	security	forces	of	the	U.S.A,	U.K,	Bahamian	and	Turks	and	Caicos	Islands.	
(Bradley,	2004)	It	had	become	clear	that	communism	was	no	longer	the	only	threat	but	that	it	had	
become	intertwined	with	other	issues	leading	to	growing	immigration	which	became	a	new	threat.	
This	became	evident	in	the	reporting	of	New	York	Times	(1980):	“among	many	U.S	officials,	there	is	
a	fear	of	the	phenomenon	spreading	and	causing	a	swelling	of	army	of	the	 jobless	or	oppressed	
from	other	Caribbean	Island	seeking	to	follow	in	the	wake	of	Cubans	and	Haitians”	(Gosko,	1980).	
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Communism	however	remained	as	a	perceived	threat	by	the	U.S.A	and	the	largest	military	build-up	
in	the	U.S	history	happened	during	1980-1985	(Salmon,	1997).	In	the	Caribbean,	the	heads	of	the	
CARICOM	member	states	collectively	expressed	their	fears	over	the	effects	which	great	power	ri-
valry	and	its	increasing	militarisation	had	in	the	region	in	the	Ocho	Rios	Declaration	in	1982.	They	
called	 for	a	 respect	 for	 the	non-interference	and	non-intervention	principles	as	well	as	declared	
their	belief	on	the	vitality	of	deepening	the	regional	integration.	According	to	the	declaration	the	
member	states	agreed	to	“Assert	our	commitment	to	the	maintenance	of	absolute	respect	for	de-
fined	 borders,	 and	 demarcated	 and	 traditional	 lines	 of	 jurisdiction	 of	 States	 of	 the	 Region”.	
(CARICOM,	1982)	The	unity	of	CARICOM	states	however	soon	broke	away	as the	Maurice	Bishop’s	
revolutionary	government	in	Grenada	began	befriending	itself	with	Cuba	and	the	Soviet	Union,	chal-
lenging	the	U.S.	hegemony	in	the	region	and	dividing	the	Caribbean	states	on	separate	camps.	
	
Soon	after	the	U.S.	intelligence	reports	showed,	that	the	Cubans	were	building	an	airfield	in	Gre-
nada,	another	coup	took	place	in	October	1983.	Bishop	was	murdered	in	October	19th,	1983	during	
the	coup	and	the	country	fell	to	a	chaos.		Worried	about	the	possible	spread	of	civil	chaos,	the	RSS	
took	the	initiative	and	invited	the	U.S.	to	help	with	the	intervention.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004.)	The	formal	
OECS	request	was	received	by	the	U.S.	in	October	23rd	citing:	
“the	current	anarchic	conditions,	the	serious	violations	of	human	rights	and	bloodshed	that	
have	occurred	and	the	consequent	unprecedented	threat	to	the	peace	and	security	of	the	
region	created	by	the	vacuum	of	authority	in	Grenada”	(U.S.	Department	of	Defence,	1983.)	
	Following	this	request,	a	multinational	military	intervention	by	the	U.S	and	six	Caribbean	nations	
took	place	in	October	25th.	The	joint	forces	toppled	the	resistance	within	three	days	and	found	out	
five	secret	military	agreements,	three	of	which	were	with	the	Soviet	Union,	one	with	North	Korea	
and	one	with	Cuba	together	with	900	nationals	of	Cuba,	Soviet	Union,	North	Korea,	Libya,	East	Ger-
many	and	Bulgaria.	(U.S.	Department	of	Defence,	1983)	International	response	however	was	against	
the	intervention,	the	UNSC	voted	in	favour	of	a	resolution	denouncing	the	invasion	with	11	in	favour,	
3	abstentions	and	1	against,	being	the	only	member	of	the	UNSCR	opposing	the	resolution	the	U.S.	
veto	prevented	it	from	passing.	(Baird,	2011,	p.	110)	Following	the	intervention,	the	U.S.	established	
annual	operation	‘Tradewinds	exercise’	in	1984,	which	brings	together	the	security	services	of	the	
commonwealth	Caribbean	countries	 to	 train	with	 the	U.S.	military	 in	hope	of	 facilitating	 further	
operations	and	enhancing	the	local	capabilities.	 
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The	coup	d’état	against	Maurice	Bishop	divided	the	CARICOM	as	Barbados,	Jamaica,	Antigua	and	
the	OECS	supported	military	action,	while	Bahamas,	Belize,	Guyana	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	op-
posed	military	action	and	preferred	to	settle	with	sanctions.	The	difference	over	the	intervention	in	
Grenada	launched	internal	crisis	in	the	CARICOM	itself	and	it	became	under	threat	of	dissolving.	The	
relationships	with	Cuba	and	differences	in	one	China	policy	added	fuel	to	the	differences	and	Viera-
Trieda	notes	the	“even	though	CARICOM	members	still	had	the	goal	of	promoting	regionalisation,	
their	differences	alone	political	and	 ideological	 lines	were	evident.	 It	showed	that	regionalization	
could	not	be	sustained	just	by	sharing	the	same	language,	historical	background	and	political	insti-
tutions.	“(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	p.	246.)	
	
During	the	third	phase	the	Caribbean	security	scene	radically	moved	towards	an	increasingly	milita-
rised	one	indicating	dominance	of	realist	thinking.	The	U.S.A	radically	militarised	its	anti-drug	ap-
proach	and	the	Regional	Security	System	was	established	between	the	Eastern	Caribbean	States	and	
Barbados	creating	the	first	collective	security	alliance	within	the	region.	The	Caribbean	states	also	
saw	the	spill-over	of	revolutionary	movements	from	Grenada	as	a	potential	threat	to	the	stability	of	
all	the	Caribbean	states	and	some	of	them	acted	in	behalf	of	collective	security	for	the	first	time	in	a	
direct	manner.	However,	the	intervention	in	Grenada	undermined	the	tradition	of	non-intervention	
and	sovereignty	of	the	small	states.	The	fact	that	the	intervention	was	done	without	UN	consent	and	
would	have	been	condemned	by	it	if	it	was	not	for	the	veto	right	of	the	U.S.A	are	against	the	liberal	
thought	and	 indicate	 towards	 realist	 thinking	 taking	place	 in	 the	Caribbean.	The	 internal	division	
within	the	CARICOM	disabled	any	attempts	to	extend	the	RSS	from	becoming	a	region-wide	alliance.	
During	the	3rd	phase	the	Caribbean	states	collective	security	began	evolving	and	the	fact	that	the	
smallest	states	decided	to	establish	the	RSS	shows	that	they	perceived	to	be	having	similar	threats	
with	each	other.		The	collective	security	did	not	however	expand	to	the	whole	CARICOM.	
	
3.2.4. Phase	IV:	New	security	understanding	awakens	(1990-2001)	
The	fourth	phase	beginning	in	early	1990s,	is	characterized	by	decreasing	militarization.		Between	
1985	and	1994	the	military	spending	in	the	Caribbean	fell	by	over	60%	and	the	focus	of	training	in	
security	institutions	increasingly	moved	towards	disaster	preparedness,	maritime	policing	and	coun-
ter	narcotics	operations.	 (Byron,	1997,	pp.	56-57.)	The	development	of	 the	 fourth	phase	 follows	
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Barry	Buzzan’s	1991	definition	of	security	as	“freedom	from	threat	and	the	ability	of	states	and	soci-
eties	to	maintain	their	independent	identity	and	their	functional	integrity	against	forces	of	change	
which	they	see	as	hostile.	The	bottom	line	of	security	is	survival	but	it	also	reasonably	includes	sub-
stantial	concerns	about	the	conditions	of	existence”	(Buzan,	1991,	pp.	432-433).	The	fourth	phase	is	
characterised	by	uncertainty	as	there	are	links	to	both	realist	and	liberal	theories.			
	
The	traditional	approach	to	security	gained	more	attention	in	1990	with	the	Iraqi	occupation	and	
U.S.	led	coalition	liberation	of	Kuwait,	which	proved	“the	inefficacy	of	conventional	military	options	
for	very	small	states”	(Baird,	2011,	p.	76).	This	highlights	the	existence	of	both	realist	and	 liberal	
thinking	at	the	time.	Also,	it	was	in	the	1990s	when	the	RSS	military	option	was	to	be	used	in	the	
CARICOM	context.	In	1990,	the	RSS	forces	were	deployed	after	the	attempted	coup	’d’état	in	Trini-
dad	and	Tobago.	The	coup	attempt	was	instigated	by	just	over	100	members	of	the	Muslimeen	youth	
group	and	succeeded	in	taking	over	the	parliament	and	holding	the	government	officials	as	hostages.	
(Baird,	2011,	p.	78)	The	attempt	highlights	not	only	the	effect	of	radical	Islam	in	the	region	but	also	
the	significance	of	integration	in	the	gun	trade	within	in	the	region.	The	115	rifles	used	in	the	coup	
attempt	were	bought	legally	in	the	U.S.A	and	then	smuggled	to	Trinidad	and	Tobago	to	be	used	in	
the	Coup.	(Baird,	2011,	p.	131)	 	The	aftermath	of	this	continued	to	the	annual	conference	of	the	
CARICOM	countries	in	1990,	where	the	conclusion	statement	revealed	that	a	multitude	of	arrange-
ments	for	mutual	security	assistance	had	been	in	the	table	but	none	had	been	taken	in	to	action.	
There	was	however	an	agreement	to	review	the	existing	arrangements,	and	to	find	out	if	they	could	
be	extended	to	provide	security	to	all	the	CARICOM	members.		Grant	notes	that	much	“like	the	pre-
vious	efforts,	the	CARICOM	wide	security	arrangement	did	not	eventuate.”	(Grant,	2006,	pp.	71-78)	
In	fact,	even	the	RSS	was	dissolved	in	mid	1994	when	the	MOU	was	not	renewed.	It	was	argued	that	
this	was	due	to	the	significant	economic	challenges	at	the	time	making	it	difficult	to	form	collective	
understandings	of	security.	The	RSS	was	re-established	with	a	treaty	in	1996	making	it	a	permanent	
organisation.	(Knight	&	Persaud,	2001;	Byran,	2011)			
	
During	the	1980s	the	U.S.	was	prepared	to	make	concessions	to	the	Caribbean	countries	to	contain	
the	threat	of	Cuba,	however,	as	the	1993	CARICOM	Summit	ratified	the	unconditional	rapproche-
ment	towards	Cuba,	which	the	U.S.	strongly	criticised	and	this	diminished	the	ability	of	Caribbean	
countries	to	play	the	Cuban	Card	to	get	security	assistance.	To	prevent	the	relationship	with	the	
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U.S.A	from	deteriorating	any	further,	the	CARICOM	rejected	the	Cuban	application	to	officially	join	
the	community	in	1996	and	again	in	1998.	(Viera-Tirado,	2004,	pp.	258-259)	The	continuation	of	the	
realist	 approach	of	 the	U.S.A.	 is	 demonstrated	 in	 speech	of	Vice-President	of	 the	U.S.	Al-Gore’s	
speech	in	the	first	meeting	of	the	Defence	Ministers	of	the	Americas	in	Virginia	1995.	Despite	Al-
Gore’s	affiliation	with	climate	change	and	new	threat	perceptions,	the	speech	emphasises	the	im-
portance	of	democracy	in	the	region,	common	history	of	the	Americas	as	colonialized	countries,	and	
the	economic	interdependency	but	places	the	territorial	integrity	as	the	most	vital	security	interest	
of	the	region.	He	calls	for	collective	security	cooperation	by	asking:		
“Can	we	develop	a	framework	for	hemispheric	security	that	will	assure	the	integrity	of	our	
borders,	reduce	the	potential	for	conflict,	increase	cooperation	and	develop	means	for	the	
fair	and	speedy	resolution	of	problems?	These	are	the	questions	that	are	being	addressed,	
and	I	think	the	answer	is	yes.	And	let	us	begin	by	acknowledging	the	eternal	and	most	fun-
damental	 issue	 of	 national	 security,	 the	 defense	 of	 our	 borders.”	 (U.S.	 Department	 of	
Defence,	1995)		
The	defence	ministerial	became	a	yearly	event	for	the	American	states	to	discuss	security	related	
issues.	The	Caribbean	states	however	looked	to	develop	new	security	understandings	which	were	
contesting	the	traditional	approach	of	the	U.S.	presented	above.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	statement	
of	Minister	Henderson	of	Antigua	and	Barbuda,	in	the	third	meeting	of	Ministers	of	Defence	of	the	
Americas	in	1998:	
“Security	can	no	longer	be	achieved	by	merely	building	walls	or	forts.	The	very	large	and	the	
very	small	states	of	this	hemisphere	have	found	that	security,	in	an	age	of	globalization,	is	
rather	complex.	Security	 includes	the	traditional-notions	of	yesteryear,	but	today,	security	
must	now	be	extended,	in	the	case	of	the	small-island	state,	to	encompass	several	non-tra-
ditional	aspects.	Natural	disasters,	for	example,	pose	a	greater	threat	to	our	security	than	
does	the	loss	of	national	territory	to	an	enemy.	Particularly	injurious	to	our	security	is	the	
peril	posed	by	global	warming.	The	emission	of	more	than	30	billion	tons	of	carbon	dioxide	
and	other	greenhouse	gases	into	the	earth’s	atmosphere,	each	year,	undermine	our	security	
and	our	well-being.	Most	harmful	are	the	ferocious	summer	storms	and	hurricanes	which	
form	in	the	Atlantic,	fuel	their	fury	with	the	ocean’s	warm	waters,	and	which	come	ashore	to	
destroy.	Their	frequency	and	their,	ferocity	are,	we	believe,	an	expression	of	the	global	warm-
ing	phenomenon.”	(OAS,	1998)	
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The	Barbadian	representative	Lionel	Nurse	agreed	and	further	called	for	a	redefinition	of	security	
by	saying	that:		
“The	delegation	of	Barbados	believes	that	special	attention	should	be	accorded	to	the	vul-
nerability	of	small	 island	States	and	small	economies	resulting	from	natural	disasters	and	
threats	......	from	human	action,	such	as	drug-trafficking,	terrorism	and	illegal	arms	transfers.	
This	issue,	with	its	far-reaching	implications,	is	vital	importance	to	the	Government	of	Bar-
bados	and	is	in	keeping	with	the	necessity	for	the	organization	to	redefine	the	definition	of	
security	to	accord	to	new	realities	as	part	of	a	process	of	revitalization.”	(OAS,	1998)	
These	statements	point	towards	evolving	understanding	of	the	security	concept	and	some	disagree-
ments	with	the	U.S.	understanding	exemplified	in	the	statement	of	Vice	President	Al-Gore.	The	OAS,	
in	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	sent	out	a	questionnaire	for	the	new	understandings	of	security	and	
these	findings	are	further	discussed	in	the	following	chapter	as	the	responses	point	towards	a	new	
approach.			
	
The	renewed	CARICOM	fear	of	nuclear	and	other	hazardous	materials	became	evident	when	they	
in	1992,	declared	their	decision	to	sponsor	an	UN	resolution	aiming	to	forbid	any	shipment	of	plu-
tonium,	other	radioactive	or	hazardous	material	in	the	Caribbean	Sea,	testing	of	nuclear	devices	and	
called	for	the	Caribbean	Sea	to	be	declared	nuclear	free	zone.	(CARICOM,	1992)	The	resolution	did	
not	pass	and	the	heads	of	Caribbean	states	condemned	the	continuing	shipping	of	nuclear	waste	
trough	Caribbean	again	in	1999	by	denouncing	Japan,	France	and	the	U.K	for	their	shipments	and	
the	U.S.	for	allowing	them	to	use	Panama	channel	for	these	purposes. 	
“The	Heads	express	their	outrage	at	the	increasing	frequency	and	volume	of	the	hazardous	
materials	being	shipped	and	the	fact	that	the	Caribbean	Sea	has	now	become	the	preferred	
transit	route,	in	spite	of	repeated	protests	by	States	in	and	bordering	on	the	Caribbean	Sea.	
Heads	of	Government	therefore	appeal	to	the	United	States,	with	its	responsibility	for	the	
passage	of	vessels	through	the	Panama	Canal,	to	use	its	authority	to	prohibit	the	shipment	
of	hazardous	nuclear	materials	via	that	route	and	into	the	Caribbean.	They	likewise	reiterate	
their	appeal	to	the	Governments	of	France,	Japan	and	the	United	Kingdom	to	desist	from	this	
dangerous	 misuse	 of	 the	 Caribbean	 Sea.”	 (CARICOM,	 1999)	
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While	there	is	a	significant	unity	among	the	Caribbean	countries	over	the	threat	formed	by	possible	
nuclear	disasters	there	are	some	internal	differences.	A	study	done	in	1990	by	Ivelaw	Griffith,	found	
out	that	there	are	many	similarities	on	the	threat	perceptions	of	regional	Caribbean	leaders,	but	that	
there	are	also	significant	disagreements.	His	 findings	point	out	 that	 the	divergence	 is	greatest	 in	
military	and	political	aspects	while	 there	 is	notable	convergence	 in	 the	economic	area.4	Another	
study	done	 in	2002	at	the	U.S.	Army	Staff	College	named	‘Caribbean	Regional	Security:	The	chal-
lenges	to	Creating	Formal	Military	Relationships	in	the	English-Speaking	Caribbean’,	found	that	“in	
the	Caribbean,	there	is	neither	agreement	on	a	regional	threat	perception,	nor	is	there	the	capacity	
to	coerce	or	use	military	force	if	such	is	required.	In	addition,	countries	continue	to	be	focused	on	
their	own	interests”	(Bishop,	2002).		
	
The	traditional	sovereignty	principle	became	again	under	threat	in	1994	in	Haiti,	where	following	the	
fall	of	Duvalier	dynasty	in	1987,	the	country	fell	to	chaos,	and	three	coups	took	place	between	1987-
1990.	In	late	1990	a	new	president,	Jean-Bertrand	Aristide,	was	elected	only	to	be	ousted	in	1991.	
Three	years	later	in	1994,	a	multilateral	military	intervention	of	20	countries,	led	by	France	and	the	
U.S	intervened	and	reinstated	Aristide	to	power.	(Murphey,	2000;	Kreps,	2007)	This	time	the	actions	
were	authorised	by	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	Resolution	940	which	recognised	that	the	
“situation	in	Haiti	continues	to	constitute	a	threat	to	peace	and	security	in	the	region”	and	author-
ised	intervention	under	the	Charter	VII	(UNSC,	1994).	Jamaica,	Belize,	Trinidad	and	Tobago	and	Bar-
bados	contributed	together	266	personnel	to	the	multinational	force	of	6,000	which	was	authorised	
to	stay	in	the	country.	The	significant	point,	stressed	by	acting	U.S	secretary	of	State	Talbot	who	held	
press	conference	before	the	intervention	took	place,	was	that	the	CARICOM	unanimously	endorsed	
the	action	(U.S.	Department	of	State,	1994).	More	than	25,000	military	personnel	supported	by	two	
aircraft	carriers	and	air	support	were	planned	to	take	part	in	the	intervention	and	the	U.S.	provided	
the	clear	majority	of	these.	However,	the	Haitian	military	command	capitulated	in	time	to	avoid	the	
bloodshed	 and	 intervention	 ended	 up	 with	 peaceful	 transition	 of	 power	 back	 to	 Aristide.	 (U.S.	
Department	of	State,	2017)	Kreps	(2007)	has	concluded	that	despite	its	political	multilateral	nature,	
the	intervention	was	largely	unilaterally	executed	by	the	U.S.	in	their	own	security	interests	as	the	
migration	flows	began	growing.	This	is	supporting	Falk’s	(1995)	earlier	findings	that	in	the	early	1990s	
																																																						
4	see	annex	2,	threat	perceptions	in	the	Caribbean	in	1990	
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trend	of	real	politic	defined	by	the	Russia’s	engagements	with	its	‘near	abroad’	and	military	actions	
of	France	in	the	Francophone	Africa	were	precedents	to	the	U.S.	intervention	to	Haiti,	which	sees	
the	fusion	of	geopolitics	and	UN	peacekeeping.	After	the	intervention,	an	UN	peacekeeping	mission	
UNMIH	stayed	in	Haiti	until	1996	and	it	was	the	first	of	a	kind	containing	a	CARICOM	contingent.	
Haiti	is	argued	to	be	the	first	model	for	the	modern	liberal	intervention	type,	as	it	was	sent	to	restore	
democracy	and	its	arguable	success	is	often	left	in	the	shadow	of	Rwanda	and	Somalia	which	took	
place	in	the	same	year	(Hall,	Hall	&	Sang,	2006).		
	
The	fourth	phase	saw	huge	changes	in	the	global	environment	as	the	Cold	War	ended,	hopes	of	new	
liberal	peace	faded	when	Iraq	invaded	Kuwait,	and	new	wars	appeared	in	Europe	and	Africa.	The	
fourth	phase	also	is	a	one	of	uncertainty.	There	were	elements	pointing	towards	greater	interna-
tional	governance	and	the	strengthening	of	 international	norms	but	there	was	also	unilateral	big	
power	interventions	proofing	the	existence	of	realist	thinking.	In	the	Caribbean,	increased	drug	traf-
ficking	and	gun	violence	challenge	the	states	internally.	The	intervention	in	Haiti	to	restore	demo-
cratically	elected	leader	was	in	support	of	the	long	respect	for	democracy	but	at	the	same	time	high-
lighted	the	renewed	interest	of	U.S.	in	the	stability	of	the	region	and	its	readiness	to	act	on	behalf	of	
it.	The	new	security	challenges,	environmental,	human,	and	vulnerability	became	priorities.	During	
the	4th	phase	the	importance	of	cooperation	was	recognised	and	the	first-time	CARICOM	contributed	
a	shared	contingent	to	an	UN	peacekeeping	mission.	However,	as	there,	despite	all	of	this,	was	no	
consensus	among	the	Caribbean	states	on	the	threats,	their	levels	or	how	to	handle	them,	collective	
security	did	not	yet	become	reality	in	CARICOM	level.		
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4. 	Phase	V:	The	last	option	(2001-2014)	
	
“If	peace	does	not	mean	freedom	from	war,	then	security	should	not	mean	protection	from	military	
aggression.	Redefining	peace	and	stability	to	include	life-enhancing	qualities	and	conditions	requires	
us	to	redefine	security	to	include	protection	from	influences	that	threaten	these	life-enhancing	qual-
ities.	Arguably	most	significant	challenges	confronting	the	small	island	states	of	the	Caribbean	at	this	
time	are	the	process	of	globalisation	and	emergence	of	trade	liberalization”	(Ambassador	Michael	
King	of	Barbados	in	the	fourth	Conference	of	ministers	of	defence	of	the	Americas	in	Manaus,	Brazil	
2000,	Quoted	in	Dennis	et	al,	2001,	p.	52.)	
		
After	having	examined	the	four	phases	of	security	in	the	Caribbean	identified	by	Jessica	Byron,	I	will	
now	discuss	the	latest	events	and	changes	in	Caribbean	understanding	of	security.	The	aim	of	this	
chapter	is	to	provide	adequate	evidence	to	identify	a	new,	distinct	phase	to	be	added	to	Byron’s	
findings.		The	Caribbean	states	are	organised	following	the	Westminster	system,	and	the	prime	min-
ister	is	the	predominant	leader,	due	to	the	small	size,	the	prime	minister	is	often	responsible	for	
security	and	is	effectively	holding	both	the	prime	ministers	and	defence	minister’s	positions.	Bishop	
argues	that	this	has	significantly	influenced	the	development	of	security	in	the	region	as	“a	country’s	
defence	and	security	policy	can	in	actuality	be	determined	based	on	the	perceptions	of	single	pre-
dominant	individual”	he	then	continues	to	argue	that	this	is	has	led	to	shortage	of	common	under-
standing	of	security	“since	other	than	crime,	there	is	very	little	or	no	public	debate	or	input	in	defence	
and	security	issues”.	(Bishop,	2002,	p.	78)	The	possibility	of	single	person	to	direct	national	security	
agenda	in	the	Caribbean	is	however	changing,	increasing	digitalisation	provides	new	opportunities	
for	transparency	and	open	policy	formulation	making	securitization	more	difficult.	The	sections	be-
low	will	discuss	Caribbean	Security	from	many	aspects	and	finally	present	evidence	for	the	appear-
ance	of	shared	understanding	of	security	in	the	region	and	increase	of	liberal	institutionalism.		
	
4.1. What	is	security	in	the	Caribbean	context	today	
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Holls	has	studied	the	environmental	aspect	of	the	Caribbean	security	and	has	acknowledged	that:	
“the	Caribbean	Region	has	weathered	a	long	history	of	re-occurring	disasters.	Natural	hazards	such	
as	earthquakes,	volcanic	eruptions,	hurricanes	and	communicable	diseases,	have	torn	economies	
apart,	wiped	away	communities,	and	isolated	towns	and	villages.	Risk	levels	in	the	Caribbean	remain	
high.	The	increasing	intensity	and	frequency	of	weather-related	hazards	form	global	warming,	rising	
urban	density	and	economic,	political	and	 social	 related	vulnerabilities,	 create	a	potent	mix	 that	
needs	to	be	seriously	addressed	to	ensure	a	safer	future.”	(Holls,	2014,	p.	122)	Studies	have	found	
out	that	the	destructive	power	of	cyclones	and	tropical	storms	has	grown	and	if	the	sea	tempera-
tures	continue	to	rise,	the	frequency	of	high	intensity	storms	will	rise	as	well	(Freedman,	2013;	GFDL,	
2017)	and	this	will	bring	the	climate	change	to	the	forefront	of	the	security	discourse	in	the	Carib-
bean.		
	
The	cooperation	 in	 this	 sector	officially	begun	with	 the	establishment	of	 the	Caribbean	Disaster	
Emergency	Response	Agency	in	1991,	as	a	way	of	organising	collective	responses	to	regional	disaster	
management	(CDEMA,	2017).	This	was	deepened	in	in	1994,	when	Barbados	hosted	the	Global	Con-
ference	on	Sustainable	Development	of	Small	Island	Developing	States	that	resulted	to	the	Barbados	
Programme	of	Action,	which	focused	on	adaptation	to	climate	change	impacts.	The	Caribbean	Com-
munity	Climate	Change	Centre	was	established	in	2005	to	coordinate	Caribbean	Regions	responses	
to	climate	change	(CCCCC,	2017).	The	CARICOM	Declaration	for	Climate	Action	recognised	the	cli-
mate	change	and	highlighted	the	special	case	of	the	Small	Island	Developing	States	and	claims:		
“that	extreme	weather	and	slow	onset	events	and	their	adverse	impacts	including	sea-level	
rise,	 coastal	 erosion,	 coral	 bleaching,	 flooding,	 ocean	 acidification,	 sea	 temperature	 rise,	
mangrove	degradation,	inundation	and	salinisation	of	coastal	agricultural	soils	and	residen-
tial	areas,	related	to	climate	change,	are	fundamental	threats	to	the	sustainable	develop-
ment	of	low-lying	Caribbean	countries	and	island	territories.”		
It	further	recognises:		
“already	with	global	warming	of	less	than	one	degree	Celsius,	SIDS	including	Caribbean	coun-
tries,	as	well	as	Guyana	and	Suriname,	are	experiencing	more	intense	storms,	droughts,	ex-
treme	weather	events,	accelerating	sea-level	rise	and	other	life-threatening	impacts 
.”	(CARICOM,	2015.)	 
Climate	change	may	endanger	the	livelihoods	of	Caribbean	societies	for	example	by	decreasing	the	
attractiveness	of	tourism	and	decreasing	marine	sources	of	nutrition.	These	could	lead	to	decreasing	
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incomes	and	 increasing	unemployment,	crime	and	eventually	 internal	destabilisation.	The	Carib-
bean	nations	have	recognised	climate	change	as	a	possible	threat	and	are	increasing	cooperation	to	
face	it.		
	
For	others,	the	security	in	the	Caribbean	is	influenced	by	trade	liberalization	and	legacy	of	structural	
adjustment	 programs,	 poverty	 and	 income	 inequality,	 crime	 and	 cuts	 on	 social	 service	 (Dennis,	
Layme,	&	King,	2001)	and	Antony	Bryan	has	found	that	“there	is	widespread	official	and	public	per-
ception	 in	 the	region	that	economic	vulnerability	 is	at	 the	core	of	Caribbean	 insecurity.”	 (Bryan,	
1998,	p.	35)	Supporting	the	priority	of	economic	aspect,	Andres	Serbin	argues	that	“in	a	market	
economy	power	 is	 at	 the	hands	of	 those	who	define	 credit:	 how	 it	 can	be	 created	and	 in	what	
amounts,	who	can	have	access	to	 it	and	under	what	conditions”	(1998,	p.	57).	However,	he	also	
recognizes	that	the	“new	security	agenda	assigns	priority	to	matters	like	control	of	drug	tragic	and	
migration,	the	environment	and	consolidation	of	democracy”	(Serbin,	1998,	p.	63).	According	to	him	
in	the	new	security	agenda	concerns	have	shifted	from	strategic	military	issues	towards	police	and	
intelligence	matters.	On	the	7th	of	June	1999,	the	OAS	adopted	the	resolution	1640	known	as	the	
“Special	Security	Concerns	of	Small	Island	States”,	and	it	states	clearly	how	complex	the	new	mil-
lennial	understanding	of	security	is	by	reaffirming	that	for	the	small	island	states		
“	security	is	multidimensional	in	scope	and	application	and	encompasses,	inter	alia,	the	mili-
tary-political	aspects	traditionally	associated	with	the	security	of	states;	the	protection	and	
preservation	of	the	state's	sovereignty	and	territorial	integrity;	freedom	from	external	mili-
tary	attack	and	coercion;	freedom	from	external	interference	by	states	or	by	non-state	agents	
in	its	internal	political	affairs;	protection	from	environmental	conditions	and	ecological	dis-
asters	which	could	imperil	its	viability;	the	link	between	trade,	economic	development,	and	
security;	and	the	ability	to	maintain	and	protect	democratic	institutions	which	ensure	domes-
tic	tranquillity“	(OAS,	1999).	
	To	combine	the	new	island	state	understanding	of	security	with	the	bigger	picture	on	the	whole	
hemisphere,	 the	OAS	 Committee	 on	Hemispheric	 Security	 sent	 out	 a	 questionnaire	 to	member	
states	titled	“New	Approaches	to	Hemispheric	Security”.		The	third	question	directly	asks,	“What	
does	your	government	consider	to	be	the	risks,	threats	and	challenges	to	security	faced	by	the	Hem-
isphere?”	(Permanent	Council	of	the	Organisation	of	American	States,	2001)	The	response	of	Do-
minican	Republic	to	the	2000	OAS	questionnaire	notes	that	there	are	differences	on	member	states	
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approaches	to	security	based	on	territorial	size,	economic	development,	population	density,	geo-
graphic	location	and	military	structures.	From	the	Dominican	Republic’s	perspective:		
“The	main	risks,	threats,	and	challenges	to	security	at	present	are	known	as	‘new	threats’.		
Some	of	these	are	listed	below: 
• Drug	trafficking	and	consumption,	and	money	laundering	
• Terrorism	
• Proliferation	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction	
• Stockpiling	of	weapons	
• Environmental	degradation	
• Uncontrolled	population	growth	
• Illegal	immigration	
• Extreme	poverty,	with	its	attendant	lack	of	health	care	and	education	
• Natural	disasters:	
§ Earthquakes	
§ Hurricanes	
§ Floods	
• Social	discrimination”	
(Permanent	Mission	of	the	Dominican	Republic	to	the	OAS,	2001)	
	
The	response	of	the	RSS	member	states	response	to	the	questionnaire	reflects	much	of	the	Domini-
can	understanding	but	also	notices	the	“asymmetrical	power	relations	and	the	temptation	to	disre-
gard	international	law”	as	a	challenge	to	hemispheric	security	(The	permament	Mission	of	Antigua	
and	Barbuda	to	the	OAS,	2002)	highlighting	the	realist	fear	of	cheating	in	international	cooperation.	
The	response	by	the	United	States	recognises	a	need	for	wider	definition	of	security	as	“too	narrow	
a	definition	of	security	will	leave	us	unprepared	to	deal	with	the	unique	concerns	of	smaller	states.”	
(The	Permanent	Representative	of	the	United	States	of	America	to	OAS,	2002)	On	the	other	hand,	
the	U.S.	return	to	the	third	question	highlights	the	threat	of	traditional	state-centred	threats	and	
refers	to	extra	regional	states	as	well	as	border	disputes	within	the	region.	The	U.S.	response	also	
recognizes	transnational	threats,	such	as	non-state	actors	related	to	terrorism,	drug	trafficking	and	
organised	crime.	 	The	non-traditional	 threats	 include	“fragility	of	democratic	governance,	human	
rights	abuses,	environmental	disasters	and	degradation,	economic	 instability,	corruption,	diseases	
such	as	HIV/AIDS	and	extreme	poverty.”	 (The	Permanent	Representative	of	 the	United	 States	of	
America	to	OAS,	2002)	The	notable	difference	is	that	the	Caribbean	states	have	did	not	recognise	
war	as	a	principle	threat	to	the	hemispheric	security	pointing	to	growing	trust	in	international	gov-
ernance	and	obedience	of	international	law	unlike	the	U.S.	response	which	follows	the	realist	theory	
and	recognises	interstate	war	as	a	threat.		
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Cope	 and	Mora	 have	 noted	 four	 trends	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 affecting	 Caribbean	 Security	 since	 the	
1990’s;	increasing	state	weakness,	increasing	transnational	security	challenges,	ineffective	coopera-
tion	between	countries	and	decreasing	dependency	from	Washington	(Cope	&	Mora,	2009),	how-
ever,	these	trends	are	artificial	and	symptoms	of	each	other’s	and	thus	deeply	intertwined	and	diffi-
cult	 to	separate	 from	another	as	will	become	clear	when	these	 I	will	be	discussed	 further	 in	 the	
following	sections.			
	
4.2. Increasing	cooperation	at	the	regional	level	
There	are	several	regional	security	governance	arrangements	existing	today,	due	to	their	variations	
in	focus	areas	they	can	be	separated	in	to	three	groupings	as	Krichner	and	Dominiguez	have	done.	
The	organizations	in	the	first	group	favour	the	traditional	balance	of	power-approach.	Whereas	in	
the	second	group	organisations	have	less	intense	level	of	internal	threat	and	for	whom	consequently	
the	security	dilemma	is	ameliorated	despite	a	pervasive	logic	of	balance	of	power	within	the	group.		
The	third	group	have	no	security	dilemma	within	the	group	and	the	source	of	threats	is	mostly	ex-
ternal.	The	AU,	ECOWAS	and	SADC	are	in	the	first	grouping,	while	OAS,	CARICOM	and	OSCE	are	part	
of	the	second	grouping.	NATO	and	EU	represent	the	last	group.	(Krichner	&	Dominguez,	2014,	pp.	
174-175)	However,	CARICOM	is	somewhat	special	case	because	security	is	by	nature	more	transna-
tional	than	internal	due	to	the	transnational	ties	with	the	US	and	other	American	states,	and	some	
European	states.		
“In	the	global	security	environment	today,	and	that	of	the	foreseeable	future,	small	states	
that	lack	capacity	and	act	on	their	own	are	likely	to	be	marginalized	or	fall	victim	to	interna-
tional	and	domestic	terrorism	transnational	organized	crime	or	criminal	gangs.	The	interna-
tional	security	environment	is	complex	and	in	continuous	change.	The	Caribbean	region	to-
day,	as	in	the	past,	is	a	host	to	many	internal	and	external	actors,	both	state	and	non-state,	
each	with	its	own	distinct	agenda.	The	critical	issue	is	not	whether	Caribbean	states	should	
cooperate,	but	rather	in	what	manner.”	(Western	Hemisphere	Security	Analysis	Center	Paper	
46,	2011,	p.	4)		
	By	2017	some	regional	security	institutions	have	been	introduced	in	the	Caribbean	and	there	ap-
pears	to	be	an	increasing	demand	for	such	institutions	and	this	will	be	discussed	next.	It	must	be	
noted	 that	 regional	 security	 in	 the	Caribbean	 is	affected	by	 the	 ineffective	cooperation	between	
countries	despite	rhetoric’s	and	official	statements	from	governments	and	sub	regional	institutions.	
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Heterogeneous	threat	perceptions,	differences	in	governance	structures,	democratization	and	liber-
alisation	undermined	the	efforts	which	took	place	after	the	Cold	War	to	build	a	hemispheric	security	
governance.	After	the	cold	war	“some	observers	were	optimistic	about	prospects	for	regional	peace	
and	security	in	the	Western	Hemisphere,	believing	that	economic	interdependence,	regional	inte-
gration	and	democratization	would	produce	a	hemispheric	‘Kantian’	peace.”	(Tikunas,	2013)	Goal	of	
uniting	under	the	OAS	security	governance,		has	been	replaced	by	efforts	to	build	sub	regional	secu-
rity	institutions	like	the	Brazil	led	UNASUR,	Venezuelan	Bolivarian	Alliance	ALBA,	and	the	Caribbean	
Community	 CARICOM	 due	 to	 the	 growing	 ideological	 divide	 among	 the	 Hemispheric	 countries	
(Tikunas,	2013;	Cope	&	Mora,	2009;	Byran,	2011).	
Table	3	Regional	organisations	in	the	Caribbean	
Organisation	 Established	 Nature	 Members	 Dominant	Power	
OAS	 1948	 Economic,	Political,		 35	 U.	S,	Brazil,	
CARICOM	 1973	 Economic,	Political,	Security	 15+5	 Jamaica,	T&T,	Barbados	
CELAC	 2010	 Economic,	Political	 33	 Venezuela,	Mexico	
UNASUR	 2008	 Economic,	Political	 11	 Brazil	
ALBA	 2004	 Economic,	Political,	Security	 11	 Venezuela,	Cuba	
RSS	 1973	 Security	 7	 Barbados,	U.	S	
ACS	 1994	 Political,	Economic	 25+7	 	
	
	
The	appearance	of	competing	alliances	has	led	to	the	Cope’s	and	Mora’s	fourth	trend;	the	decreasing	
dependency	on	Washington.	(Cope	&	Mora,	2009)	Rising	regional	organisations	are	providing	sense	
of	security	to	the	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	countries	(Tikunas,	2013)	to	a	state	that	Council	of	
Foreign	report	states	“the	era	of	the	United	States	as	the	dominant	 influence	 in	Latin	America	 is	
over”	(Council	of	Foreign	Relations,	2008).	Venezuelan	president	Hugo	Chávez	sought	to	oppose	the	
US	by	developing	relationships	with	countries	that	oppose	the	status	quo	and	US	hegemony,	namely	
with	Russia,	China,	Iran	and	Cuba.	(Tikunas,	2013)	Between	the	Caribbean	Community	and	the	US	
there	have	been	sensitive	disputes	over	what	constitutes	as	security.	During	the	Cold	War,	the	U.S	
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was	 prepared	 to	 radically	 violate	 the	 political	 and	 territorial	 sovereignty	 of	 Caribbean	 and	 Latin	
American	countries	if	it	felt	it	was	in	their	national	interest	for	example	in	Nicaragua	in	the	1970s,	
Cuba	in	1959,	Panama	in	1989	and	Grenada	1983.	
		
Due	to	some	extent,	 the	decreasing	dependency	on	the	U.S.	military	 is	mutual,	as	the	Caribbean	
countries	can	no	longer	play	the	Cuban	Card	as	they	did	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	as	an	argument	for	
military	assistance	from	the	U.S.	 (Byran,	2011,	p.	12)	 	Cope	and	Mora	point	out	that	the	U.S	has	
neglected	its	interests	by	not	giving	the	Latin	America	and	Caribbean	adequate	attention.	They	argue	
that	this	is	due	to	that	‘region	contains	no	conventional	threats	to	the	United	States”	(Cope	&	Mora,	
2009,	p.	65).	There	are	however	significant	and	sophisticated	non-traditional	threats	to	the	US	in	the	
Caribbean.	In	2001	Knight	and	Persaud	have	identified	that	for	the	US,	the	main	security	issues	are	
preventing	flow	of	narcotics,	illegal	immigrants	and	illegal	money	from	the	Caribbean	into	the	United	
States.”	(Knight	&	Persaud)	Until	late	1990s	the	U.S.	preferred	large	overseas	facilities,	often	in	form	
of	air	 force	bases	with	 landing	strips,	after	the	handover	of	Panama	Channel,	and	US	withdrawal	
from	Howard	Air	base	in	1999	there	has	been	a	shift	towards	small	facilities	and	in	the	greater	Latin	
American	context	these	bases	are	known	as	‘Forward	Operation	Locations’	or	‘Cooperative	Security	
Locations’	(COHA,	2009).	
	
The	diplomatic	distancing	between	the	U.S.	and	Caribbean	countries	is	however	not	completely	new,	
and	appeared	already	 in	 the	1990s.	Firstly	 there	was	a	 strong	blame	game	 for	 the	 financial	 con-
straints	set	for	the	Caribbean	states	in	the	structural	adjustment	programmes	by	the	financial	insti-
tutions	such	as	the	IMF	and	WTO	which	are	dominated	by	the	U.S.,	in	the	1990s.	In	1997,	there	was	
serious	disagreements	between	the	U.S.	and	some	Caribbean	in	forming	of	the	Ship	rider	agreement	
that	allows	U.S.	authorities	to	pursue	suspected	drug	traffickers	to	their	territorial	waters.	An	exam-
ple	of	this	disagreement	can	be	seen	in	the	prime	minister	of	Barbados,	Owen	Arthur’s	statement:		
“There	are	those	who	have	argued	that	sovereignty	does	not	matter,	that	we	are	incapable	
of	 providing	 for	 our	 own	defences	against	 the	advances	of	 the	drug	barons,	 and	 that	we	
should	surrender	our	defences	on	this	sphere	to	the	tender	mercies	of	those	more	capable	
than	ourselves	to	provide	our	defence.	This	was	the	very	doctrine—The	Brezhnev	Doctrine-	
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that	led	to	the	subjugation	of	Eastern	Europe	on	the	grounds	that	the	could	not	provide	for	
their	own	defence”.	(Allen,	1997)		
Even	the	RSS	has	seen	the	decline	with	the	U.S.	engagement	and	relying	heavily	on	U.S.	financing	it	
has	faced	severe	budget	constraints.	The	EU	estimates	that	the	RSS	operates	with	only	40-50%	of	
the	approved	annual	budget	due	to	non-payment	of	dues	by	the	participating	countries.		More	lately,	
there	has	however	been	some	renewed	interactions	with	the	U.S.	In	2009	Washington	initiated	pro-
cess	to	gain	access	to	more	than	seven	military	facilities	 in	Colombia	and	Council	of	Hemispheric	
Affairs	has	noticed	that	the	American	military	presence	in	the	Caribbean	basin	has	“been	steadily	
expanding,	justified	domestically	as	necessary	measure	to	combat	ballooning	drug	production	and	
terrorist	movements.	There	are	still	U.S.	military	bases	in	El	Salvador,	Honduras,	Curacao	and	Aruba,	
Cuba,	Antigua	and	Barbuda	and	in	the	Bahamas	where	NATO’s	Naval	Forces	Sensor	and	Weapon	
Accuracy	Check	Site	program	is	active.	(COHA,	2009)	While	the	official	reason	for	these	bases	is	to	
combat	drug	trafficking,	they	also	serve	dual	purpose	to	keep	the	left	leaning	governments	in	Cuba	
and	Venezuela	in	order.	
	
The	EU	has,	to	some	extent,	however	increased	its	involvement	and	is	supporting	both	national	and	
sub	regional	programmes.	In	2014,	it	for	example	allocated	€5,6million	for	St	Kits	and	Nevis	safety	
and	security	sector	in	aiming	to	enhance	institutional	capacities	in	preventing	and	detecting	crimes.	
And	in	Barbados	EU	provided	€1,2	million	for	acquiring	technical	forensics	equipment’s.	EUs	Instru-
ment	for	Stability	has	also	allocated	€3	million	for	implementing	SEACOP	III	programme	lasting	36	
months	and	additional	2,5	million	for	RSS	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	to	address	the	regional	aspects	
of	 illicit	 trafficking.	 (Council	of	 the	European	Union,	2014)	Other	example	 is	 the	Global	Crisis	Re-
sponse	Support	Programme,	which	focused	on	strengthening	crisis	response	and	early	warning	ca-
pacities	as	well	as	inter	agency	cooperation	which	run	from	2015	to	2017	and	was	financed	by	the	
EU	with	2.6	million	Euros.	(CARICOM,	2017)	The	individual	EU	countries	are	also	doing	bilateral	ar-
rangements,	for	example	in	January	2017,	the	Netherlands	announced	its	interest	in	increasing	its	
cooperation	with	CARICOM	in	climate	change,	disaster	risk	management	and	security	areas	among	
others.	(CARICOM	Secretariat,	2017)	This	is	a	reflection	that	the	Dutch	Armed	Forces	are	still	officially	
responsible	for	guaranteeing	security	in	the	Caribbean	part	of	the	Kingdom	of	Netherlands	and	main-
tains	over	500	military	personnel	 in	 the	Caribbean.	Their	official	 tasks	 range	 from	protecting	 the	
borders	and	maintaining	international	rule	of	law	to	combating	violent,	and	drug	related	crime	and	
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assisting	local	police.	(Netherlands	Ministry	of	Defence,	2017)	The	connections	with	Europe	mean	
that	any	event	in	the	continent	is	reflected	in	the	Caribbean.	In	2015,	after	the	terrorist	attacks	in	
Paris,	 the	state	of	emergency	declared	by	France	was	expanded	to	 include	the	French	Caribbean	
territories	Guadeloupe,	French	Guiana,	Martinique,	St	Martin	and	St	Barths.	(Caribbean	News	Now!,	
2015)		
	
4.3. Military	security		
Insecurities	in	Caribbean	are	sourced	to	many	sources,	but	traditional	military	thinking	is	still	 im-
portant	in	the	region	as	there	are	undecided	boarder	disputes	for	example	between	Dominica	and	
Haiti,	Venezuela	and	Guyana,	Nicaragua	and	Colombia,	additionally	the	Cold	War	era	special	status	
of	Cuba	in	international	arena	is	still	vulnerable	and	undecided	despite	the	recent	relaxation	of	the	
U.S.A,	the	interventions	in	Grenada	and	Haiti	all	make	the	traditional	military	security	still	relevant	
for	the	Caribbean	region.	(Desch,	Dominiguez,	&	Serbin,	1998,	pp.	2-3)	The	return	of	big	power	pol-
itics	in	Europe,	embodied	in	the	military	stand-off	over	Ukraine,	have	also	appeared	in	the	Carib-
bean.	Russia	has	increased	its	activities	in	the	region	and	in	2014	the	defence	minister	Sergei	Shoigu	
stated:	"Under	the	prevailing	circumstances	we	need	to	ensure	a	military	presence	in	the	western	
Atlantic	and	eastern	Pacific	oceans,	the	waters	of	the	Caribbean	basin	and	the	Gulf	of	Mexico."	(BBC,	
2014)	He	also	announced	that	Russia	is	looking	to	open	new	military	bases	in	Cuba,	Venezuela	and	
Nicaragua.	This	is	part	of	Russia’s	attempts	to	challenge	NATO	and	the	fact	that	Caribbean	Sea	lanes	
have	been	vital	for	NATO	supply	routes	and	especially	during	the	Cold	War	as	becomes	clear	from	
the	1982,	U.S.	DoD	statement:	
“in	war	time,	half	of	NATO’s	supplies	would	transit	by	sea	from	Gulf	ports	trough	Florida	
Straits	and	onward	to	Europe.	Much	of	the	petroleum	shipments	and	important	reinforce-
ments	destined	for	US	forces	in	Europe	would	also	sail	from	Gulf	Port.	The	Security	of	our	
maritime	operations	in	the	Caribbean,	hence	is	critical	to	the	security	of	the	Atlantic	Alliance.”	
(Schoultz,	1987,	p.	203)	
The	Caribbean	Council,	a	non-profit	think-tank,	argued	that	Russia’s	presence	in	the	Caribbean	is	
now	stronger	than	ever	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	they	see	Russia’s	intention	to	regain	long	
term	military	presence	in	the	Caribbean	Basin	as	an	attempt	by	President	Putin	to	erode	the	U.S.	
leadership	in	the	region.	(The	Caribbean	Council,	2015)As	NATO	is	winding	down	its	operations	in	
Afghanistan	and	refocusing	on	Europe	and	Middle-East	the	supply	routes	might	again	become	of	
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strategic	interest.	A	demonstration	of	NATO’s	prevailing	interest	in	the	region	can	be	seen	in	the	
deployments	Canadian	destroyers	to	operation	Caribbe,	and	Exercise	Unitas	in	2010’s.	In	2013	alone	
the	Canadian	vessels	intercepted	5,080	kilograms	of	cocaine	before	it	entered	U.S.	from	where	some	
of	it	was	ultimately	targeted	for	Canadian	markets.	In	addition	to	NATO	countries,	such	as	Canada,	
US,	France,	Netherlands	and	the	UK’s	participation	in	maritime	operations	in	the	region,	NATO	also	
signed	an	Agreement	on	Security	Information	with	Colombia	in	2013	setting	out	bases	for	future	
defence	cooperation.	(NATO	Association	of	Canada,	2014)	The	competition	over	influence	over	se-
curity	and	military	matters	has	increased	in	the	Caribbean	from	the	1990s	during	which	the	strategic	
importance	of	Caribbean	seemed	to	vanquish.	Presence	of	military	alliance	such	as	NATO,	which	
survived	its	existential	debate	after	the	Cold	War	ended	and	the	predominant	threat,	Soviet	Union,	
disappeared,	can	serve	as	an	example	for	the	Caribbean	countries	as	a	reasonably	successful	secu-
rity	cooperation	model	as	NATO	has	been	able	to	adopt	to	the	new	security	setting	and	renew	itself	
to	face	new	threats.	
	
The	links	between	external	powers	and	the	Caribbean	have	also	been	understood	in	terms	of	coop-
eration	with	the	external	powers,	this	is	demonstrated	for	example	with	the	‘operation	Tradewinds’,	
established	already	in	1984.	The	exercise	is	still	upheld	yearly	and	in	2016	it	had	expanded	to	include	
13	CARICOM	countries,	U.S,	Canada,	France	and	U.K	military	personnel.	The	focus	of	the	exercise	
has	also	moved	increasingly	towards	enhancing	regional	cooperation	in	providing	disaster	response	
and	humanitarian	assistance	from	solely	military	security	operations.	(Now	Grenada,	2016)	
	
The	big	power	rivalry	and	competition	over	influence	is	not	the	only	geopolitical	threat	to	the	region;	
boundary	disputes,	land	or	sea,	form	a	traditional	security	threat	to	the	Caribbean.	In	terms	of	inter-
national	 law,	 land	boarders	can	be	seen	to	be	simpler,	as	they	require	mutual	recognition	as	the	
international	boarders	can	be	de	jure,	treaty	based;	or	de	facto,	mutually	accepted	reality	on	the	
ground.	Whereas	the	maritime	boarders	are	more	difficult	as	they	are	done	unilateral	declarations.	
Only	where	the	boundaries	overlap	with	another	state	is	it	necessary	to	create	bilateral	agreement.	
Additionally,	land	borders	often	go	back	decades	or	even	centuries	in	history	whereas	maritime	bor-
ders	begun	radically	expanding	after	the	second	world	war.	Disputes	over	borders	are	maintained	at	
diplomatic	level,	where	for	example	mutual	governance	or	mutually	exclusive	area	over	the	disputed	
territory	is	established.	Milefsky	has	recognised	that	even	these	disputes	can	turn	to	violent	“when	
the	border	populations	fall	prey	to	popular	violence,	armed	incidents,	criminal	or	illegal	activities.”	
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(Milefsky,	2004)	Traditionally	the	Caribbean	states	have	opted	for	a	peaceful	boundary	relations,	
and	this	is	particularly	true	among	the	dependencies	which	have	the	highest	ration	of	settled	bound-
aries	to	political	entity.	(Milefsky,	2004,	p.	83)	Despite	this	trend	of	seeking	peaceful	solutions	there	
are	still	several	border	disputes	left	in	the	Caribbean	basin	as	demonstrated	by	the	map	2.	The	Car-
ibbean	states	themselves	however	do	not	see	war	and	interstate	war	as	a	threat	and	the	Havana	
Declaration	of	CELAC	proclaimed	the	Caribbean	as	a	zone	of	peace	(CELAC,	2014).	
	
Map		2,	Border	Disputes	in	the	Caribbean	(Atlas	Caraibe,	2017)	
	
Sometimes	the	traditional	threats	become	tangled	with	new	threats,	and	borders	may	become	con-
tested	all	despite	the	existing	agreements.	This	was	the	case	in	2008,	when	Colombian	bombers	fly	
across	the	border	to	Ecuador	to	bomb	a	camp,	killing	FARC’s	second	in	command	Luis	Edgar	Devia	
Silva,	known	as	Raul	Reyes.	His	body	was	retrieved	after	the	bombing	by	Colombian	soldiers.	This	is	
an	example	that	confirms	Milefsky’s	theory	mentioned	earlier.	Infuriated	by	these	actions,	Ecuador	
broke	off	diplomatic	ties	with	Colombia	and	began	assembling	troops	to	the	Colombian	border.	Co-
lombia	accused	Ecuador	for	supporting	the	rebel	movement,	and	Ecuador	state	denied	this	in	the	
following	statement:	
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"The	government	of	Ecuador	energetically	rejects	these	accusations	which	cynically	add	to	
the	hostile	attitude	shown	in	the	recent	violation	of	our	sovereignty”	(Reuters,	2008).	
The	OAS	took	a	stand	on	the	issue	as	it	escalated	and	conflict	appeared	imminent.		OAS	resolution	
930	reminds	of	the	charter	of	the	OAS	which	recognises	the	sovereignty	of	each	state,	and	identified	
that	the	Colombian	“act	constitutes	a	violation	of	the	sovereignty	and	territorial	integrity	of	Ecuador	
and	of	principles	of	international	law;”	(OAS,	2008)	Venezuela,	led	by	President	Hugo	Chávez	pledged	
support	to	Ecuador	in	any	circumstances	also	mobilised	its	armed	forces	sending	10	tank	battalions	
towards	the	border	while	mobilising	the	air	force	and	navy	at	the	same	time,		and	pledged	with	full	
scale	war,	 should	 Colombia	 execute	 similar	 actions	within	 Venezuelan	 territory.	 (Romero,	 2008)	
(CNN,	2008)	The	2008	stand-off,	between	the	regionally	powerful	and	significant	Colombia,	Ecuador	
and	Venezuela,	 shows	 that	 in	 the	wider	 Caribbean	 traditional	military	 security	 aspect	 is	 still	 im-
portant.	This	event	also	increased	the	interest	of	CARICOM	countries	to	speed	up	the	security	coop-
eration	and	seek	shelter	from	the	collective	defences	pointing	to	internally	driven	need.	
	
From	more	objective	point	of	view,	another	perspective	to	security	in	the	5th	phase	can	be	under-
stood	in	terms	of	the	location	at	the	Caribbean	Sea,	making	the	aspect	of	maritime	security	is	vital	
for	the	island	states.	In	addition	to	this,	man	made	threats	combined	with	the	location	at	the	Carib-
bean	Sea	means	that	the	aspect	of	maritime	security	is	vital	for	the	island	states.	World	Bank	report	
identifies	several	aspects	of	modern	maritime	security:	
“There	are	currently	a	number	of	threats	that	directly	affect	international	maritime	security.	
It	may	be	said	that	most	major	of	these	are	(A)	transnational	organised	crime	including	the	
illicit	traffic	in	narcotics,	arms	and	weapons,	and	persons;	(b)	Terrorism;	and	(c)	piracy	and	
armed	robbery	at	sea.	Likewise,	the	major	indirect	or	aggravating	factors	may	be	identified	
as	(biological,	chemical	and	nuclear	weapons,	and	their	precursors,	and	(B)	municipal	laws	
and	procedures	in	relation	to	company	incorporation	and	ship	registration”	(Moseley,	2009,	
p.	11).		
		The	geopolitical	location	of	Caribbean	is	noted	by	Griffith	who	identifies	three	aspects	that	are	im-
portant:	possession	of	strategic	materials,	location	on	vital	sea	lanes	of	communication	and	security	
networks	(Griffith,	1998).	The	Caribbean	produces	oil,	most	importantly	in	Venezuela,	which	the	5th	
largest	oil	producer	in	the	world,	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	within	the	CARICOM.	Some	diamonds,	
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manganese	and	nickel,	and	bauxite	in	Jamaica.	The	significance	of	CARICOM	as	U.S.	trading	partner	
is	exemplified	by	the	fact	that	32%	of	the	aluminium	ore	used	in	the	U.S.	in	2014	was	from	Jamaica.	
(Observatory	for	Economic	Complexity,	2014)	Possession	of	these	strategic	materials	may	be	a	temp-
tation	for	another	state	to	initiate	conflict	over.	Secondly	the	location	of	Panama	Channel,	connect-
ing	Pacific	and	Atlantic	Oceans	means	that	ships	must	go	through	the	Caribbean	waters	on	their	way	
and	this	has	various	impacts	on	the	Caribbean.	Not	only	does	many	countries	have	interest	on	pre-
serving	the	freedom	of	the	seas	in	the	region,	but	the	number	of	ships	passing	through	increases	the	
risk	of	collision	or	another	kind	of	accident.	For	example,	the	nuclear	waste	from	the	UK	and	France	
is	shipped	through	the	Caribbean	and	there	have	been	fears	that	these	shipments	might	become	
targeted	by	terrorists.	(Milefsky,	2004;	Knight,	2004)		These	fears	have	not	been	completely	drawn	
from	nothing,	the	2008	Colombian	raid	in	Ecuador,	revealed	that	FARC	had	obtained	9	kilograms	of	
depleted	Uranium	stolen	from	undiscovered	source.	In	addition	to	this,	in	2009	an	employee	of	Ar-
gentinian	oil	drilling	company	stole	canister	of	Caesium	137,	a	nuclear	substance,	and	demanded	
ransoms	 for	 it.	 (COHA,	2010)	On	top	of	 this,	 the	 rising	hemispheric	power	Brazil,	 is	developing	a	
nuclear	submarine.	(World	Nuclear	Association,	2017.)	
	
4.4. Geonarcotics	
Geonarcotics,	a	concept	that	explains	the	multiple	aspects	of	the	narcotics	phenomenon.	The	defi-
nition	given	to	it	by	Griffith	is	worth	quoting	in	length	here:		
“it	posits,	first	that	the	phenomenon	is	multidimensional,	with	four	main	problem	areas	(drug	
production,	consumption-abuse,	trafficking,	and	money	laundering);	second	that	these	give	
rise	to	actual	and	potential	threats	to	the	security	of	states	around	the	world;	and	third	that	
the	drug	operations	and	the	activities	they	spawn	precipitate	both	conflict	and	cooperation	
among	various	state	and	nonstate	actors	in	the	international	system.	Over	and	above	this,	
the	 term	 captures	 three	 factors	 besides	 drugs:	 geography,	 power	 and	 politics.”	 (Griffith,		
1998,	p.	56)			
Some	of	the	Caribbean	countries	are	consisting	of	several	islands	(for	example,	Bahamas	consists	of	
seven	hundred	islands	and	combined	Virgin	Islands	comprise	some	hundred	islands)	making	them	
easy	to	enter	and	exit	without	being	detected.	Another	geographical	factor	is	the	physical	proximity	
to	South	America	which	is	a	major	drug	supplier	and	to	north	America,	which	has	a	major	demand	
for	drugs.		(Griffith,	2004,	p.	32)	
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Thirdly	it	must	be	noted	that	the	European	Union	does	not	end	on	Irish	or	British	mainland	cost,	it	
extends	to	the	Caribbean;	as	French	Guiana,	Guadeloupe	and	Martinique	are	departments	of	France,	
Anguilla,	Bermuda,	The	British	Virgin	Islands,	The	Cayman	Islands,	Montserrat	and	Turks	and	Caicos	
Islands	are	yet	British	dependencies	while	Bonaire,	Curacao,	Saba	and	St	Maarten	are	part	of	the	
Netherlands.	There	are	then	existing	transport,	customs	and	immigration	connections	between	Eu-
rope	and	Caribbean	thus	opening	it	to	the	second	large	demand	area	for	drugs.	(Griffith,	1998)	This	
has	been	also	realised	by	the	Caribbean	states,	as	becomes	clear	in	the	statement	of	the	Attorney	
General	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	Ramesh	Maharaj,	already	in	1996:	
“Let	me	state	emphatically	that	the	greatest	threat	to	our	sovereignty	comes	from	the	drug	
lords.	These	are	 international	 criminals	who	have	no	 respect	 for	 sovereignty	or	boundary	
lines.	They	do	not	stop	at	our	borders	or	anyone	else’s	borders	with	their	poison.	The	truth	is	
that	they	cannot	carry	on	their	deadly	trade	without	violating	our	borders	and	sovereignty.	
If	the	United	States	of	America,	the	most	powerful	nation	in	the	world,	cannot	fight	the	drug	
barons	alone,	how	can	we?	Drug	traffickers	are	international	criminals	and	can	be	defeated	
only	with	international	cooperation.”	(Quoted	in	Bearsworth,	2000,	p.	201.)	
The	2007	estimate	is	that	240	metric	tons	of	cocaine	went	through	CARICOM	countries	in	its	way	to	
the	U.S	and	Europe.	The	increased	stepping	down	of	Mexican	drug	cartels	has	decreased	the	drugs	
transported	via	land	routes	and	increased	the	shipping	trough	Caribbean	waters.	(CITS,	2011)	U.S.	
Southern	Command	statistics	claimed	in	2013	that	80%	of	drugs	destined	to	the	U.S	come	from	the	
Caribbean	waters	(Sánchez-Azura,	2013).		
	
4.5. Prevailing	vulnerability	
“Given	the	vulnerabilities	of	Caribbean	states	(viz.	small,	relatively	weak	states),	to	the	negative	
fallout	of	globalisation	and	globalism	process,	and	to	the	increasing	pressures	from	the	region’s	
and	global	hegemonic	power,	Caribbean	leaders	have	no	choice	but	to	seek	out	and	work	within	
broad	regional	and	global	multilateral	institutions	in	pursuit	of	their	policies	and	goals.	Such	in-
stitutions	provide	at	least	some	insulation	from	the	onslaught	of	real	and	serious	threats	to	the	
Caribbean	states’	sovereignty	and	to	the	human	security	of	its	peoples.”	(Knight,	2004,	p.	435.)		
Griffith	recognises	two	types	of	vulnerability:	firstly,	subjective	that	is	how	other	states	see	another	
state,	for	example	a	state	is	may	be	perceived	to	be	weak,	for	example	for	having	a	population	too	
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small	to	provide	credible	military	capabilities	and	therefor	to	be	an	easy	and	vulnerable	target	for	
attack.	Secondly	objectively,	where	the	military,	geographic	economic	factors	combined	with	organ-
isational	difficulties	make	the	state	factually	weak	to	challenge	(Griffith,	1990;	1998;	2004).	Accord-
ing	to	Jessica	Byron	the	Caribbean	nations	are	vulnerable	due	to	their	high	dependency	on	interna-
tional	trade,	limited	variety	of	exports,	and	the	state’s	capacity,	that	is	restricted	by	human	and	fi-
nancial	 resources,	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	markets	 or	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 international	 negotiations.	
(Byron,	2007.)	
	
From	the	restrictions	caused	by	small	 size	and	 limited	resources	rises	 the	 fourth	trend	noted	by	
Cope	and	Mora	is	the	decreasing	sovereignty,	which	combined	with	ineffective	governance	in	all	
levels	of	society	and	inequality	leading	to	Weak	states.	Many	central	American	and	Caribbean	states	
have	difficulties	delivering	basic	services,	criminal	violence	and	corruption	are	 in	many	countries	
increasing,	and	Cope	and	Mora	argue	that	increasing	migration	and	rise	of	populism	combined	with	
decreasing	support	for	democratic	rule	indicate	that	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	Nations	are	los-
ing	faith	in	the	ability	to	democratic	governments	to	meet	expectation.	The	increase	of	“transna-
tional	security	challenges”,	as	Cope	and	Mora	present,	is	related	to	the	ineffectiveness	of	the	gov-
ernments	to	control	their	marine	and	land	territories	allowing	space	for	criminal	organisations	traf-
fic	illegal	drugs,	weapons,	people,	money	and	intellectual	property.	(Cope	&	Mora,	2009.)			
	
	
4.6. Terrorism,	9/11	
The	CARICOM	 issued	 the	Nassau	Declaration	on	 International	 Terrorism	on	12th	of	October	 con-
demning	the	September	11th	attacks	in	the	U.	S,	but	appeared	more	concerned	about	the	economic	
impact	on	the	region	than	an	actual	attack	on	the	U.S.		
“We	are	painfully	aware	of	 the	disruption	caused	to	 the	global	economy	by	 the	events	of	11	
September.	We	are	concerned	that	the	attacks	developments	have	been	especially	devastating	
to	our	tourism,	aviation,	financial	services	and	agricultural	sectors,	which	are	the	major	sources	
of	 GDP,	 foreign	 exchange	 earnings	 and	 to	 the	 employment	 in	 the	 countries	 of	 our	 Region.	 “	
(CARICOM,	2001)	
The	 impact	of	Paris	attacks	of	2015	was	already	discussed	earlier,	highlighting	 the	way	 in	which	
events	in	the	continental	Europe	have	immediate	impact	to	the	Caribbean	security.		To	what	extend	
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terrorism	can	be	separated	from	gun	violence	performed	by	gangs	and	other	criminal	organisations	
can	be	debated.	However,	in	the	Caribbean	context,	the	terrorist	threat	rises	from	their	affiliation	
to	the	U.S.	There	are	fears	that	terrorists	can	move	material	and	personnel	using	the	same	route	as	
drug	traffickers	and	that	Caribbean	could	become	collateral	damage,	such	as	in	the	case	of	possible	
attack	on	nuclear	waste	shipments	or	other	hazardous	material	that	is	shipped	through	the	region	
as	discussed	in	the	earlier	section.		
	
4.7. Haiti	all	over	again	
It	took	ten	years	for	the	international	community	to	realise	that	the	leader	which	was	restored	to	
power	by	international	intervention	in	1994,	had	not	managed	to	restore	democracy	or	stability	to	
Haiti.	In	February	2004,	insurgents	controlled	much	of	the	northern	part	of	the	country	and	in	the	
29th	of	February,	President	Aristide	resigned	“under	intense	pressure	from	the	United	States	and	
the	threat	of	an	invasion	of	the	capital	by	armed	insurgents”.	(Polgreen	&	Weiner,	2004.)	At	the	
same	day	the	UNSCR	1529,	much	like	the	resolution	940	in	1994,	constituted	that	situation	in	Haiti	
was	a	threat	to	international	peace	and	security.	Multinational	Interim	Force	was	again	authorised	
followed	by	the	establishment	of	the	United	Nations	Stabilisation	Mission	in	Haiti	with	the	resolu-
tion	1542	in	April.	In	January	2010,	an	7,0-magnitude	earthquake	devastated	Haiti	killing	more	than	
220,000	people	and	levelling	the	capital	city.	MINUSTAH	was	reinforced	and	mandate	extended	to	
support	the	recovery	and	to	maintain	some	security	in	the	country.	(UN,	2017.)	CARICOM	saw	the	
removal	of	Aristide	from	power	as	illegal	action	and	protested	the	intervention.	They	claimed	that	
the	US	and	France	had	been	involved	in	the	insurgency	which	led	to	the	removal	of	Aristide	from	
power.	The	intervention	and	the	trusteeship	that	followed	has	been	argued	to	be	neo-colonial	and	
Caribbean	countries	saw	the	intervention	as	a	U.S	involvement	in	the	domestic	politics	of	a	sover-
eign	state	(Edozie,	2008).	The	statement	of	Arthur	Owen,	The	Prime	Minister	of	Barbados	brings	up	
the	opposition	for	the	actions	which	led	to	Aristide’s	fall:		
“In	analysing	the	events	of	February	29th	and	their	aftermath,	 it	 is	 important	to	deal	 in	a	
balanced	way	with	all	of	the	complex	factors	which	had	a	bearing	on	the	crisis.	CARICOM’s	
role	should	not	be	to	serve	as	an	apologist	for	Mr.	Aristide	and	the	excesses	of	his	leadership,	
but	neither	should	be	condoned	nor	in	anyway	support	the	resort	to	unconstitutional	means	
to	remove	a	duly	elected	leader	from	office.	The	judgement	on	the	performance	of	any	leader	
should	be	made	by	 the	electorate	at	 the	ballot	box,	not	by	 insurrection	and	 the	 resort	 to	
force.”	(Arthur,	2004)	
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He	continues	to	talk	about	the	CARICOM	led	diplomatic	process	which	had	been	taking	place	at	the	
same	time	and	had	been	discarded	by	the	US	and	France.	He	concluded	that	“all	of	our	membership	
felt	a	bitter	sense	of	disappointment	and	betrayal”.	(Arthur,	2004)	Following	the	international	part-
ners	disregard	of	the	CARICOM’s	preference	in	Haiti	in	2004,	there	has	been	a	significant	move	to	
build	resiliency	and	regional	capacity	to	attend	issues	without	any	external	interventions.	
 
4.8. The	appearance	of	CARICOM	security	sector	
“Evidently,	CARICOM	wants	to	develop	a	regional	security	regime	that	would	include	the	ac-
tive	 participation	 of	 the	United	 States,	 but	which	 the	United	 States	would	 not	 dominate.	
“(Knight	&	Persaud,	2001,	p.	31.)	
	
“It	has	to	be	acknowledged	at	the	outset	that	the	integration	movement	in	the	Caribbean	and	
the	individual	countries	of	the	Caribbean	Community	(CARICOM)	now	have	to	grapple	with	
challenges	which	either	did	not	exist	or	are	now	more	severe	than	anticipated	when	the	move-
ment	was	established	in	1973.”	(Arthur,	2014)	
	
In	July	2001,	the	conference	of	heads	of	government	of	the	Caribbean	community	agreed	on	estab-
lishing	a	Regional	Task	Force	on	Crime	and	Security,	after	admitting	that	the	new	forms	of	crime	and	
violence	pose	 threats	 to	 the	 regions	stability.	The	 task	 force	 reported	back	and	 identified	 illegal	
drugs,	 illegal	firearms,	corruption,	rising	crime	against	persons	and	property,	criminal	deportees,	
growing	lawlessness,	poverty	and	inequity	and	terrorism	as	the	principal	security	threats	to	the	re-
gion.	The	report	also	recommended	deepening	the	regional	cooperation	and	establishing	new	insti-
tutional	 frame	 for	 it.	 (RTFCS,	 2002)	 The	 member	 states	 endorsed	 the	 report	 and	 in	 2006	 the	
CARICOM	agreed	to	establish	management	structure	for	the	crime	and	security	agenda	including	
Council	of	Ministers	with	responsibility	for	national	Security	and	law	Enforcement	(CONSLE)	and	an	
implementation	Agency	for	Crime	and	Security	(IMPACS)	with	a	primary	responsibility	for	 imple-
menting	the	regional	crime	and	security	agenda.	(CARICOM,	2006).	However,	the	biggest	land	mark	
of	Caribbean	security	 integration	was	 in	2007,	when	the	Heads	of	Government	of	the	Caribbean	
Community	in	the	18th	inter-sessional	meeting	declared	security	as	the	fourth	pillar	of	the	commu-
nity.	 (CARICOM,	2007)	 	This	was	a	culmination	of	a	 long	process.	Already	 in	1990	at	 the	time	of	
Jouni	Montonen	 Master’s	Thesis	 University	of	Tampere	
	 52	
Jamaat	al	Muslimeen	insurrection	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	prime	minister	of	Barbados	Erskine	San-
diford	called	for:	
”	 ...	 the	expansion	and	consolidation	of	 the	Regional	Security	System	(RSS)	 in	 the	Eastern	
Caribbean	to	include	as	many	CARICOM	states	as	possible.	I	would	urge	that	the	RSS	be	in-
vested	with	the	authority	and	resources	to	deal	with	all	aspects	of	regional	security	including	
the	interdiction	of	drug	trafficking,	surveillance	of	our	coastal	zones,	mutual	assistance	in	the	
event	of	natural	disasters	as	well	as	threats	to	constitutional	democracy	from	criminals,	ter-
rorists,	mercenaries	and	other	enemies	of	democracy...	The	Preservation	of	 law	and	order	
and	national	security	contribute	to	growth	and	development	through	the	promotion	of	sta-
bility.	We	must	therefore	expand	our	integration	efforts	to	include	the	area	of	regional	secu-
rity.”	(Graner,	2016)	
	
	The	World	Cricket	World	Cup	(CWC)	was	arranged	in	2007	simultaneously	in	9	independent	coun-
tries	and	this	demanded	significant	cooperative	efforts	such	as	creating	a	single	visa	for	tourists	and	
providing	security	 for	 the	events.	The	Liaison	office,	 later	known	as	Regional	Crime	and	Security	
Strategy	Central	Coordinating	Unit	(RCSS-CCU)	with	it	two	sub	agencies,	the	Join	Regional	Commu-
nications	Centre	(JRCC)	and	the	Regional	Intelligence	Fusion	Centre	(RIFC)	were	formed	to	support	
security	in	this	event.	These	agencies	were	highly	successful	and	they	were	made	permanent	parts	
of	 IMPACS	 at	 the	 same	 conference	which	 recognised	 security	 as	 the	 fourth	 pillar	 of	 CARICOM.	
(CARICOM,	2017)		The	success	of	CWC	can	be	argued	to	have	been	the	driver	for	the	security	coop-
eration,	as	the	deputy	prime	minister	of	Barbados,	who	chaired	the	Cricket	World	Cup	Committee	
stated	that:	
“Sometimes	you	need	catalysts	to	bring	about	transformation	in	society.	There	is	no	doubt	
in	my	mind	that	the	challenges	of	trying	to	keep	the	region	secure	during	Cricket	World	Cup	
will	come	to	be	regarded	as	one	of	the	major	catalysts	in	the	integration	movement	of	the	
region.”	(Grenade,	2007,	p.	12)		
The	prime	minister	Patrick	Manning	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago	endorser	this	statement	in	the	opening	
statement	at	the	fourth	meeting	of	CONSLE:		
“Cricket	World	Cup	must	not	be	regarded	as	an	event	that	has	come	and	gone	in	terms	of	the	
security	of	the	Region.	Rather,	it	should	be	regarded	only	as	the	catalyst	that	drove	us	into	
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taking	the	urgent	action	which	in	fact	has	long	been	necessary	for	the	continued	survival	of	
our	Region”	(Manning,	2007)	
	
Inspired	by	the	success	of	CWC,	the	fifth	meeting	of	CONSLE	mandated	IMPACS	to	develop	a	re-
gional	crime	and	security	strategy	and	in	2013,	IMPACS	came	out	with	the	first	‘CARICOM	Crime	and	
Security	Strategy’	which	cemented	the	shared	vision	 for	security	 in	 the	region.	The	strategy	 ties	
together	economic	prospects	of	the	Caribbean	integration	process	with	the	developing	of	shared	
threat	perceptions:	
“Security	is	the	single	most	important	responsibility	of	the	State.	Peace	and	prosperity,	
freedom	and	liberty	all	depend	on	security.	Security	is	therefore	a	core	developmental	goal.	
It	also	provides	the	foundation	for	other	developmental	goals.	Investment,	trade,	economic	
development	and	growth	depend	on	the	protection	of	life	and	property.	The	CARICOM	
Single	 Market	 and	 Economy	 can	 only	 develop	 and	 prosper	 in	 a	 secure	 environment.”	
(IMPACS,	2013.)	 
The	Crime	and	Security	Strategy	identified	threats	to	the	region	in	four	levels	they	are	presented	in	
the	following	table:	
	
Table	4	Threats	to	the	Caribbean	Region	according	to	the	Crime	and	Security	Strategy	2013.	
Level	 Tier	I,	Immediate	Significant	Threats	 Tier	II,	Substantial	Threats	
Tier	III,	Signif-
icant	Poten-
tial	Risks	
Tier	IV,	Future	Risks	
Description	 High-probability,	High-Impact,	clear	and	present	dangers	
Likely	and	relatively	
High-impact	but	lesser	
threat	than	tier	I	
High-impact,	
but	low	prob-
ability	
Transnational,	future	
risks	where	probabil-
ity	and	impact	is	un-
known	
Key	Threats	
Transnational	organised	Crime,	Traf-
ficking	of	Illicit	drugs	and	illegal	guns,	
Gangs	and	Organised	Crime,	Cyber	
Crime,	Financial	Crimes,	Corruption	
Human	Trafficking	and	
Smuggling,	Natural	Dis-
asters,	Public	Disorder	
Crimes	
Attacks	on	
Critical	Infra-
structure,	Ter-
rorism	
Climate	Change,	Pan-
demics,	Migratory	
Pressure	
	
	
What	is	notable	in	the	new	Caribbean	understanding	of	modern	threats	is	that,	despite	that	there	
are	ongoing	border	disputes	in	the	region,	 interstate	war,	and	the	traditional	military	security	as	
viewed	by	realism	in	general	is	absent.	The	prime	source	of	insecurity	appears	to	be	the	non-state	
actors.	Another	significant	point	is	the	identification	of	Cyber	Crime	as	tier	1	threat.	To	large	extend	
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it	could	be	concluded	that	the	its	rise	is	due	to	the	high	levels	of	offshore	banking	and	its	dependency	
on	modern	technologies.	
	
Following	the	first	Crime	and	Security	Strategy,	in	2014	CARICOM	adopted	even	wider	plan,	named	
‘The	Caribbean	Community	Strategic	Plan	for	2015-2019’	(2014),	in	its	Thirty-Fifth	Regular	Meeting	
held	in	Antigua	and	Barbuda.	The	plan	includes	extensive	section	on	security	and	it	identifies	eight	
areas	of	focus:	deepening	crime	prevention	initiatives	and	programmes;	facilitating	justice	reform;	
pursuing	 functional	 cooperative	 security	 engagements	 to	 tackle	 and	 manage	 shared	 risks	 and	
threats;	enhancing	human	resource	capabilities;	strengthening	regional	security	systems;	strength-
ening	CARICOM	borders;	and	Enhancing	maritime	and	airspace	awareness.	The	plan	also	identifies	
HIV	and	other	diseases,	‘gender-related’	issues	like	inequality	and	violence	against	women,	poverty,	
drug	abuse	as	social	issues,	whereas	crime	and	insecurity	are	named	as	the	principal	threats	to	se-
curity,	as	well	as	obstacles	to	social	and	economic	development.	Other	major	threats	are	climate	
change	and	natural	disasters.	The	plan	endorses	the	discussion	over	climate	change	mentioned	here	
earlier.	The	plan	notices	the	increased	exposure	to	these	events	and	argues	that	“natural	disaster	
management	is	therefore	of	critical	importance	to	the	Region”,	it	further	describes	climate	change	
as	‘existential	threat	to	small-island	and	low	lying	coastal	states”	which	the	CARICOM	states	are.	
(CARICOM,	2014,	p.	42)	
 
The	fifth	phase	has	seen	the	awake	of	CARICOM	common	security	strategy,	increasing	involvement	
of	extra	hemispheric	powers	and	realisation	of	new	security	threats,	not	the	least	climate	change.	
Forcing	the	democratically	elected	president	in	Haiti	to	step	down	the	international	partners	how-
ever	distanced	 themselves	 from	 the	Caribbean	 states	which	began	 increasingly	 to	 look	 for	each	
other	as	sources	of	security.	The	significant	push	for	deeper	cooperation	came	from	the	positive	
experience	gained	organising	the	Cricket	World	Cup	in	2007,	which	created	trust	on	collective	capa-
bilities.	As	the	treats	are	increasingly	admitted	being	transnational	the	Caribbean	states	have	ob-
tained	a	transnational	approach	against	them.	The	need	for	this	cooperation	is	however	not	purely	
internal,	external	powers,	led	by	the	U.S	and	the	EU	have	seen	increasing	Caribbean	integration	in	
the	security	sector	as	an	effective	tool	to	enhance	their	own	security	interests.	
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5. Results	and	Conclusions	
5.1. Results	
“CARICOM	faces	a	multiplicity	of	risks	 from	increasing	number	of	sources	 in	an	era	where	an	
interconnected	world	has	created	great	opportunities	but	also	new	vulnerabilities	and	threats	
that	could	seriously	impact	the	region’s	stability	and	socio-economic	development.	The	risks	to	
CARICOM	states	are	increasingly	numerous	and	complex.”	(IMPACS,	2013,	p.	23)	
	
The	table	5	gathers	some	characteristics	of	the	5	phases	of	security	identified	in	this	discussion.	Cer-
tain	trends,	like	the	concept	of	vulnerability,	carry	on	from	one	phase	to	another	while	others	like	
climate	change	appear	in	some	but	not	others.	Similarly,	the	changes	in	global	environment	have	
impact	on	the	Caribbean	security	and	the	five	phases	are	reflections	of	the	political	security	environ-
ment	at	the	time.		The	understanding	of	Caribbean	security	is	reflecting	a	global	setting	in	certain	
time	in	history.	Links	to	the	former	colonies,	U.S.	hegemony	in	the	hemisphere	and	its	regional	and	
extra	regional	challengers	have	all	influenced	the	concept.	Becoming	independent	in	the	middle	of	
the	Cold	War	and	being	under	the	threat	of	nuclear	war	made	the	Caribbean	states	soon	recognise	
the	limitations	of	their	size.	No	military	deterrence	would	be	credible	against	external	threats	and	
therefor	protection	was	searched	from	the	International	law	and	multilateral	institutions	such	as	the	
UN	and	OAS.	This	was	the	first	stage	of	independent	security	thinking	in	the	Caribbean.		From	here,	
there	was	however	realisation	of	the	possible	threats	caused	by	non-state	actors,	either	on	their	
own	or	acting	as	a	big	power	proxies	leading	to	the	increasing	militarisation	and	return	to	traditional	
self-help	thinking	and	Barbados,	for	example,	established	its	own	military	forces.	The	third	phase	
emphasises	the	increased	tensions	between	Cuba	and	the	US	but	also	sees	the	culmination	of	mili-
tarisation	in	the	form	of	military	intervention	to	Grenada.	The	intervention	would	have	been	con-
demned	in	the	UN	without	the	U.S.	veto	and	this	highlights	the	erosion	of	the	principles	like	non-
intervention	and	sovereignty,	which	were	long	defended	by	the	Caribbean	states.		
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From	the	increased	militarisation	in	the	1980s,	the	Caribbean	states	moved	to	the	fourth	stage	of	
security	understanding,	defined	by	confusion,	as	 the	Cold	War	came	to	an	end,	and	new	threats	
became	higher	priorities.	Climate	change	and	increasing	erosion	of	social	fabric	and	the	prevailing	
vulnerability	has	brought	the	global	trend	of	regionalisation	intensively	to	the	Caribbean.	New	blocks	
were	formed	and	new	forms	of	cooperation	was	searched.	However,	within	the	CARICOM	context,	
the	security	remained	absent	from	the	integration	agenda,	which	focused	on	economic	integration	
until	the	fifth	phase	started.	In	the	fifth	phase	CARICOM	countries	came	together	and	recognised	
the	need	of	their	cooperation.	Security	became	one	of	the	official	pillars	of	CARICOM	and	ultimately	
the	shared	understanding	of	security	became	reality	 in	the	form	of	CARICOM	Crime	and	Security	
Strategy	 in	2013.	 	The	security	 landscape	 in	 the	Caribbean	after	 the	appearance	of	 the	Common	
Crime	and	Security	Strategy	 in	2013,	will	be	defined	by	 the	success	of	 their	 cooperative	 security	
arrangements.	Collectively	 the	small	 states	have	a	viable	change	 to	get	 their	voices	heard	 in	 the	
international	forums	and	to	promote	peaceful	and	law	obeying	international	society.		
	
5.2. Conclusion	
“The	concept	of	security	for	the	small	island	states	of	the	Hemisphere	is	multidimensional	in	
scope,	involving	state	and	nonstate	actors,	and	includes	political,	economic,	social,	and	natural	
components.	The	small	island	states	have	concluded	that	among	the	threats	to	their	security	
are	illegal	drug	trafficking,	the	illegal	trade	in	arms,	increasing	levels	of	crime	and	corruption,	
environmental	and	economic	vulnerability,	particularly	in	relation	to	trade,	susceptibility	to	
natural	disasters,	transportation	of	nuclear	waste,	and	increased	levels	of	poverty.”	(OAS,	
1998) 
 
This	study	as	examined	the	question	over	how	the	understanding	of	security	has	developed	in	the	
CARICOM	member	states	using	a	case	study	approach	and	by	analysing	variety	of	documents	and	
existing	 literature.	The	focus	was	on	the	external	 threats	 thus	excluding	the	threats	 to	the	state	
rising	from	internal	economic	and	political	conditions.	It	took	up	the	Jessica	Byron’s	identification	
of	four	phases	of	security	understanding	among	the	OECS	countries	and	argued	that	it	can	be	ex-
panded	to	the	whole	CARICOM	context	as	well.	This	was	then	discussed	and	Byron’s	phases	were	
extended	to	length.			
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The	significance	of	former	colonial	countries	in	the	Caribbean	periphery	decreased	significantly	after	
the	decolonisation	in	1960s	and	70s,	and	it	did	even	more	so	after	the	Cold	War	ended.	However,	I	
argue	that	the	notion	of	developing	‘small	island	states	security’	has	become	again	increasingly	im-
portant.	This	argument	led	to	confirming	the	hypothesis	identifying	a	new,	5th	phase	of	Caribbean	
security	understanding,	which	I	claim	started	in	the	late	1990s.	Identifying	a	new	stage	of	security	
in	the	Caribbean	thinking	came	clear	while	trying	to	find	out	the	answer	to	the	original	research	
question:	what	led	to	the	deepening	of	CARICOM	security	cooperation.		
	
The	understanding	of	security	 in	the	Caribbean	has	changed	from	the	self-help	and	go-alone	ap-
proaches	first	 initiated	in	the	early	 independence	years	to	comprehend	the	shared	and	common	
challenges	faced.	The	positive	experiences	from	the	success	of	RSS	and	the	security	arrangements	
during	the	Cricket	World	Cup	demonstrated	the	Caribbean	leaders	the	benefits	of	collective	actions.	
Faced	with	increasingly	transnational	challenges	such	as	illicit	trafficking	of	goods	and	people,	cli-
mate	change,	migration	and	natural	disasters	the	Caribbean	states	have	accepted	the	limitations	
set	to	them	by	their	small	size	and	look	to	gain	from	collective	security	as	sharing	resources	and	
knowledge	benefits	all.		The	hypothesis	was	that	lack	of	military	capabilities	due	to	small	sizes	of	the	
Caribbean	nations	the	development	of	critical	security	concerns	has	displaced	traditional	military	
security	in	the	Caribbean	context	and	there	is	evidence	to	support	this.	Caribbean	states	lack	the	
resources	to	maintain	military	forces	purely	for	deterrence	purposes	against	unknown	enemy,	es-
pecially	when	the	example	from	Kuwait	and	Grenada	proved	them	to	be	of	little	use	against	larger	
enemy.	 	 It	 is	 reality	 that	CARICOM	has	developed	a	new	security	 framework	 for	 the	sub	region.	
However,	the	Caribbean	countries	are	heavily	indebted	and	rely	on	the	bigger	powers	in	and	outside	
the	region	to	support	them.	The	RSS	relies	on	U.S.	to	finance	it	and	this	points	to	the	direction	that	
the	increasing	security	integration	among	the	OECS	members	is	forced	upon	them	by	external	pow-
ers.	On	the	other	hand,	the	small	size	sets	many	demands	for	cooperation	and	pooling	and	sharing	
resources.	Need	for	security	has	increased	as	the	threats	have	become	transnational	and	facilitated	
by	the	modern	technology	have	 impacts	despite	 large	distances	as	seen	 in	the	case	of	Cold	War	
rivalry,	invasion	of	Kuwait,	9/11,	and	Paris	attacks.	The	Caribbean	states	have	increased	their	coop-
eration	due	to	the	harsh	reality	of	modern	world,	they	have	recognized	that	they	lack	the	capabili-
ties	to	survive	the	challenges,	they	have	and	this	supports	the	 idea	that	 integration	and	security	
cooperation	among	CARICOM	countries	is	indeed	internally	driven.	External	powers	such	as	the	U.S.	
and	the	EU	are	providing	additional	 rewards	 for	 regional	cooperation	as	 they	see	 this	as	a	cost-
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effective	way	to	attend	their	own	interests	and	the	Caribbean	countries	stand	to	gain	from	this	if	
they	stand	as	one.	The	reason	for	new	security	concerns	in	the	Caribbean	is	not	purely	domestic	but	
is	also	sponsored	by	the	external	powers.		
	
5.3. Reflections	
It	is	hard	to	imagine	doing	research	in	a	region	without	having	visited	it,	and	I	feel	like	the	exchange	
period	I	had	in	2016	was	extremely	helpful	when	completing	this	thesis	as	 it	provided	first	hand	
experience	on	the	everyday	life	in	the	region.	The	use	of	within	case	study	as	a	method	of	choice	in	
this	case	opened	the	evolution	of	security	from	the	Caribbean	perspective.	To	some	extent,	inter-
viewing	some	long-term	politicians	and	experts	could	have	provided	more	in-depth	knowledge	on	
the	matter.	Also,	more	original	documents	and	white	papers	of	the	Caribbean	states	would	have	
been	interesting	sources	for	this	study,	but	as	they	were	not	available	due	to	slow	digitalisation	in	
the	small	Caribbean	states,	they	were	left	out.		There	was	however	the	existing	research	done	on	
some	of	the	matters	discussed	in	this	thesis	and	the	available	documents	proved	to	be	adequate.		
	
5.4. Recommendations	for	further	research	
Caribbean	integration	processes	pre-date	those	of	the	European	Union,	and	it	can	be	argued	that	in	
many	ways	the	CARICOM	was	ahead	of	the	EU	in	the	1980s.	However,	the	deepening	of	integration,	
particularly	in	the	security	and	collective	defence	areas	as	well	as	the	economic	integration	such	as	
introducing	single	currency	area,	of	the	EU	has	overtaken	the	CARICOM.	The	EU	now	has	a	Common	
Security	and	Defence	Policy,	Treaty	on	mutual	assistance,	but	it	is	still	short	from	the	NATO’s	Article	
5-type	 collective	 defence.	 The	many	 similarities	 in	 institutional	 structures	 and	 in	 the	 challenges	
which	the	CARICOM	and	EU	share,	would	make	an	interesting	comparative	study,	this	was	however	
was	not	possible	within	the	aims	of	this	thesis.		
	
Additionally,	studying	why	the	CARICOM	countries	have	not	followed	the	example	of	Costa	Rica,	
and	demilitarised	their	states	to	save	resources	and	better	allocate	them	for	policing	and	other	so-
cial	security	sectors.	The	defence	forces	of	Jamaica,	Barbados	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	now	have	
counter	narcotics	operations	added	to	their	national	defence	tasks	but	to	what	extend	the	military	
structures	are	nowadays	relevant	can	be	questioned.		
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The	impact	of	decriminalising	marijuana	in	the	U.S	and	some	European	states	is	yet	uncertain.	Some	
evidence	has	been	sighted	pointing	towards	re-arranging	the	transportation	cycle	so	that	marijuana	
grown	in	the	U.S.	 is	 transported	to	the	former	origin	countries	where	 it	remains	 illegal.	To	what	
extend	the	continental	transport	route	for	Cocaine	from	south	America	to	the	northern	America	is	
being	closed	by	the	state	enforcing	its	authority	in	Mexico,	and	the	peace	process	in	Colombia	is	
likewise	unclear.		It	could	lead	to	increasing	pressures	for	criminals	to	seek	other	shipment	routes	
thus	increasing	the	challenge	of	the	small	Caribbean	countries	to	counter	these	actors.		
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Annexes:	
	 Annex	1	RSS	mobilisations	(According	to	RSS	website,	(RSS,	2017)	
1983	 The	Grenada	Intervention	Operation	
1989	 Hurricane	Hugo	in	Antigua,	St	Kitts	and	Nevis	and	Montserrat	
1990	 Aftermath	of	attempted	coup	in	Trinidad	and	Tobago	
1994	 St	Kitts	and	Nevis,	Internal	security	(Prison	uprising)	
1995	 Hurricanes	Lois	and	Marilyn	in	Antigua	and	St	Kitts	and	Nevis	
1998	 Hurricane	George	in	St	Kitts	and	Nevis	
1998	 St	Vincent	and	the	Grenadines,	Operation	WEEDETER	(eradication	of	cannabis)	
2003	 St	Lucia,	Operation	of	Bordelais	(transfer	of	prisoners	to	a	new	prison)	
2005	 Barbados,	Operation	Restore	Peace	
2007	 Cricket	World	Cup	07	in	RSS	member	States	
2010	 Haiti,	Operation	Restore	Peace	
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	 Annex	2	Threat	perceptions	in	the	Caribbean	1990	(Griffith	I.	L.,	1990,	p.	37)	
	
	
